-
In his book Genesis, Michel Serres develops a philosophical
geometrics in which straight lines are equated with the line of reason:ing
that cuts through and thus wounds a more primary--both physical and
psychic--multiplicity. As Serres states, linking this fundamental
multiplicity to the concepts of chaos and noise: "The straight line of
reason... must turn its back on... chaos.... What noise does the
classical age repress, to what clamor does it close its ears, in order to
invent our rationalism?" (20-1).¶ In the book's rhetorical matrix,
the straight line is the figure of the age of reason and progress, and the
work of rationalizing is quite literally understood as surveying and as
road-work; the cutting of a concrete visto--an epistemological
highway--through an inherently multiplex nature. As Serres notes, "we
construct a real which is a rational one, we construct a real,
among many possibilities, which is a rational one, among other
possibilities, just as we pour concrete over the ground" (25). The
ultimate aim of this rational project, a.k.a. the Enlightenment (at least
in one of its many versions), is--as
the Frankfurt school had already diagnosed, in particular in Adorno's and
Horkheimer's The Dialectic of the Enlightenment--to gain
dominion and control; to create, in the words of a neo-Adornian such as
Jean Baudrillard, a state of overall operational simulation, in which the
real has become--or is treated as--the rational.¶ One might well
argue that this equation is what not only Genesis, but all of
Serres's work most consistently argues against--especially in its link to
political exploitation and to a state of deadly stasis--and it is this
"disenchantment of the world" that Serres's most vitriolic rhetorics are
directed against. As he argues in Hermes III, rationalism has
become thanatocratic, a sentiment also echoed in Genesis: "the
stable chain of the rationalists only expresses... their desire of
domination. The empire is never more than some inflated local, a part that
took the place of the whole.... There is reason there, there is violence
there. There is order and growth there.... This chain is the chain of
reason, this chain is the chain of death.... Rationalism is a vehicle of
death" (72-3).¶ As the "other" to the rational line, Serres
envisions a living chain that is defined not by necessity
(Aristotle's ananké as the basis of rationalism), but by a
more complex combination of chance and probability (what Aristotle called
tyche and automaton respectively). This fragile, tangled
up, twisted and knotted chain is related to unpaved paths--like those used
by Native American people--rather than to concrete highways. Based as they
are on maze-like meanderings and the politics of soft transfers, the
geometrics of this chain evoke an eco:logical, "feng shui" science that
honors rather than wounds the natural contours of the landscape.¶
Because such unpaved, winding paths are often temporary and thus fluid and
dynamic, they de-linearize not only space but also time. They grow over
and vanish, like the wake of a ship on the ocean, or like traces of
footsteps on the smooth space of the prairie. As Serres states, "here
then is the chain: white sea or white plain, background noise, surge,
fluctuation of the surge, bifurcation, repetition, rhythm or cadence,
vortex. The great turbulence is constituted, it fades away, it breaks. And
disappears as it came.... This chain is not the chain of reasons.... Here
we are in liquid history and the ages of waters. It is the chain of
genesis. It is not solid. It is never a chain of necessity. Suddenly,
it will bifurcate. It goes off on a tangent. It surrenders to... the
fluctuations of the sea.... [It] is not a chain of
chance either, it would remain meticulously broken. It is a chain of
contingency [like a multiplex narrative].... A fragile
and soft chain, easily cut, fragments easily replaced, a chain almost
always broken.... It is the chain of life"(71-2).¶ Serres argues
that since the Enlightenment, science has separated its agenda from this
chain and has thrown in its lot with the straight line of rationalism, a
move through which it has also aligned itself to (and thus subjected
itself to) the latter's socio-political agenda. In that the sciences, like
the rational control systems, favor dialectical, dualistic thought, they
linearize and thus also martialize themselves. (In Serres's book La
Naissance de la Physique: Dans le Texte de Lucrèce: Fleuves et
Turbulences. [Paris: Minuit, 1977], this is negotiated as the
quarrel between Mars and Venus.) They "easily line themselves up
under the
relentless tyranny of bureaucracy" (105, emphasis added). Because
dialectics is logical and static "what is called dialectics is a rather
crude trick of the straight line's, a logic of carefully placed
invariants" (101). In opposition, "the work of transformation is that of
the multiple" (101).¶ Serres's claim is that in order to become alive
again, the various fields of science must once more open themselves up to
the fragile chain of being (or rather: the "chain of becoming") and of
genesis: "science must dissociate itself from it [the line of
rationalism]. The soft quasi-chain... glimpsed, sketched, faintly, its
local, tangential, contingent, aquatic drives and pulls, its open, free
and unstable links, this badly woven fabric, or these proximities almost
always abandoned as trials, attempts, essays, hold true... on occasion,
for inert, more often for the living, little for the pathological and
sometimes for the cultural, they hold true... for history" (73). [1]
-
A return from "linearization" to the
chain
of being:becoming and an opening up of spaces of possibility implies the
break-up of the borders defined by the line of rationality. Only a
chaotic, "attractive" writing--the development of a "third (writing)
space"--can "make a ruckus... in the midst of... [the] dividing waters"
(13) that make up a binary logic. In contrast to such a transgressive
un-dividing, rationalization, in science as well as in social engineering,
implies a mania for a sub-division that is always in complicity with power
and control. [2]
- As Serres notes, "Division into
subsets minimizes fury. Division into subsets protects, preserves the
unity of the body as a whole, because it tempers... free energy and
channels it" (85). In this context, cutting a populace up into various
groups, be it classes or castes, must be recognized as a violent act of
exerting power and control: "Some put trust in the moving flux that does
the coding and in its process, others put trust in the topography that
loses it, in the classifying labyrinth that uses it up" (94). In these
dynamics, "the more classification there is, the less evolution there is,
the more classes there are, the less history there is, the more coded the
sciences are, the more administrating there is, the less movement there
is" (94). Once more, the ultimate aim and result of sub-division is the
creation and maintenance of a state of stasis brought about by a process
of purification, which is why "rationalists are priests, busily ruling
out, cleaning up the filth, expelling people, purifying bodies or ideas"
(99). In fact, "politics... have a function and a passion to reduce
multiplicities, to reduce possibilities, to work at the confluences" (24).
It is to such agendas of political order(ing)s that "alas! the multiple is
always sacrificed" (31): [3]
-
Unlike order, with its project of
demarcation and purification, the multiple is never (at) an end. Rather,
it is a permanent beginning and always "before" order. It is the condition
of existence in the sense of "presupposition": ("the surge is
first--conditional" [97]) which, once it is ordered (when it "lies still
and stands stagnant" [97]) becomes merely the "conditional"--now in the
sense of a merely "hypothetical state" or also the "state of affairs."
There are always forces operative within a stabilized and stabilizing
system that contain the conditions of possibility and of keeping the system
closed, [4]
-
although there are chances to
re-create the
truly conditional because "the conditions of possibility run, at times,
through space... through society... through the body of silence... through
beauty" (44). Not only here, Serres's discourse can be folded into the
discourse of cultural studies, especially as it concerns subaltern and
minority studies. In a historico-cultural context, for instance, settlers
work against the subjunctive and the virtual:possible by thinking in a
binary fashion that excludes inmixing, parasiting, hybridity, interfacing
and cross-overs: "As soon as they find, discover, invent a blank place,
the clamorous noisemakers who take the places race in, invade it, pin it
down with noise, fury, hatred and illusion, they bury it beneath their
tumult, and the original ones give up the place.... There are no
conquerors, there are excluded ones, banished ones, in search of a
place.... But this work of the negative drives out, banishes, excludes the
middle, the third position" (77-78). Only a "third estate" or a "third
space" which would include the complex space of the parasite--and in a
literary frame, paraciting--could deconstruct the empire of duality and
open up a once more multiplex field, [5]
-
a space once more populated by "crowds, packs, hordes" which are also Gilles
Deleuze's counterterms to "the mass," which Serres, in a possible reference
to Deleuze, relates to Leibniz, who "called them aggregates." Such an aggregate
"is not a well-formed object" (2-3). It is always on such unstable,
"far from equilibrium" machinic aggregates (Deleuze would call them
"desiring-machines") that ordered systems are erected: [6]
-
History, then, is originally a
virtual
field of possibilities: a "plane of immanence" laced with chance tissue.
This plane functions as an underlying historical matrix, because "the
multiple... [is] the ordinary lot of situations" (5) and "history is...
born... of circumstances" (100), as C.S. Peirce noted when he called for a
historical tychism. On this multiple site, artificial
orders--"planes of transcendence"--and divisions (of people, of classes,
of territories, of eras in historiography) are stenciled. In order to
deterritorialize these planes of transcendence again, one has to treat
them, like every complex and chaotic aggregate, as "not a closed system"
(98). [7]
-
The pure--either white or
black--background noise on which each order rests is ultimately untamable,
even by the "relentless" project of rationalism, which is why the state of
historical multiplexity is so terrifying (i.e., the sites of Pynchon's
"Zone(s)": Europe in Gravity's Rainbow, America in
Mason & Dixon) and in some of its aspects is so downright
inhuman: "Under the world of language, this wave, and beneath the wave,
the black noise. The unknown, the infra-subject of hate and
multiplicity" (139). [8]
-
The multiplex background noise of
matter is
a chromatic clamor, an acoustic "turbulence, it is order and disorder at
the same time, order revolving on itself through repetition and
redundancy, disorder through chance occurrences, through the drawing of
lots at the crossroads, and through the global meandering, unpredictable
and crazy. An arborescent and turbulent rumor" (59). Inherently random, it
resists its ultimate integration into ordered linearity. In terms
of chaos-theory or the theory of complexity, it is non-compressible, which
means that it is un-categorizable and "incalculable... measureless. It
always exceeds the machines' capacity for calculation" (127), as is the
case with a series of numbers, which is defined as random if the smallest
algorithm capable of specifying its recreation by a computer needs about
the same number of bits of information as the original series consists of.
This is why to compute a chaotic, complex, and multiplex system, one would
need a computer "as big as the system itself." In a logic comparable to
Borges's famous map, one would need a map as big as the territory. [9]
-
A narrative field that keeps a large
number
of stories going on at the same time, criss-crossing them, without a final
resolution other than death, follows the same agenda as philosophy does in
Serres's narrative. For both, the objective is to conditionalize, which
means to open up possibilities rather than to work toward suturing
confluences. The objective is to climb up the descending slope of growing
order toward more multiplexity and toward more bifurcations. As Serres
notes, "the philosopher keeps watch over unforeseeable and fragile
conditions, his position is unstable, mobile, suspended, the philosopher
seeks to leave ramifications and bifurcations open, in opposition to the
confluences that connect them or close them. He goes back up the thalweg a
bit, he climbs the chreod" (23). Multiplex storylining or philosophizing
creates a space of a thousand plateaus, a "multiplicity of spaces" (60)
that changes and oscillates according to each point-of-view, so that the
narrative (as well as history and philosophy) becomes a picture-puzzle,
like "paintings that, from one angle, show a nude woman, from another a
scene from history, from elsewhere still a seascape. They are composed on
purpose to say everything, under the assumption that from every site their
scenography changes" (50). In such a multiplex topology, "all narratives
have value, all theories as well. Every site delivers its coherence,
invisible from any neighboring site" (51).¶ The utopia of such a
narrative aggregate is Babel, as the figure of "an unintegrable
multiplicity, a sort of intermittent aggregate, not closed upon its unity"
(124). In an image reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari's diagram of the
rhizome, in which order and disorder are forever intersecting, and in
which every production of order and information is countered by
dissemination and deconstruction, Serres "propose[s] the hypothesis, on
which Kant must have paused awhile, that the universe vibrates between the
one and the other, that it never stops pulsating... from a homothetic
tower in which the apex... is a system, to a homothetic tower in which the
apex... is a multiplicity" (130).¶ Like Derrida's, but even more like
Deleuze and Guattari's, Serres's project is inherently literary. How to
think the world without falling into the trap of stasis and linear, that
is, ultimately, conceptual, thinking. As he states, evoking both the
fluidity of chaotic systems and processes as well as the complexity of the
weather system, "we despise contents, we administer flow charts" (3). The
question is whether it is possible to "speak of multiplicity itself
without ever availing myself of the concept?" (4); concepts being
static and conceptual, because "coding is nothing more than showing
unities in the stead of multiplicitous noise. Thus are concepts born"
(86). The philosophical project would be "to think a new object, multiple
in space and mobile in time, unstable and fluctuating like a flame,
relational" (91). In this project, Serres draws on Nietzsche's "fluid
dynamics of perception" as well as on Bergson, who is (with his theory of
"becoming" and "processes" and his meditations on the "pornography of
perception") also an important influence on Deleuze and Guattari. The
question is whether the human mind can think without concepts; or, in
Bergsonian terms, whether it is possible to think pure duration: "To think
the surge, to think time, to think process, directly.... The pure
processual is chaotic, or, as I put it, chreotic, as well" (97). [10]
-
The multiplex, then, is another
word for
the conditional. It designates the set of possibilities, the worlds that
are "ifed" by choosing one rational "new world order" over all others. In
a state in which everything is in a state of equal potentiality, there is
no separation into reality (is) and imagination (if),
because "before the point or the sense is decided, there is a space where
all senses are in flux" (51). This state of un-differentiation is that of
a pure multiplexity: "The raucous, anarchic, noisy, variegated...
jumbled-up, mixed-up multiple, criss-crossed by myriad colors and myriad
shades, is possibility itself. It is a set of possible things, it may be
the set of possible things" (22). Serres uses once more natural
images to describe the multiplex. Multiplex spaces are ecological
biospheres, or what Deleuze and Guattari would call "smooth spaces": "The
forest is multiplicity. The sea, again, is multiplicity" (56). Not
surprisingly, the weather, as the muse of chaos theory, is the multiplex
system par excellence. In a reference to La
Naissance, Serres talks of "the background noise of the climate. We
must praise any language that associates meteoric clusters, hail,
hurricane, turbulence, squall, with the Greek word climate, which
means: inclination" (102). As a chaotic system, the "climate is an
aggregate concept" (102). It shares with the rhizome the characteristic of
being "n-1" ("It constitutes linear multiplicities with
n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid
out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted
(n-1)" (Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari.
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert
Hurley, et al. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983. 21), because it is an
incomputably complex aggregate; such as a true democracy is an
incomputably complex aggregate (the fact that Whitman was so very aware of
when he talked about America as an "aggregate" in the "Democratic
Vistas" [in: Complete Poetry and Selected Prose. Ed. J. E.
Miller. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. 455-501]). A "true" democracy
should be
like such a natural aggregate, in the same way in which "a cloud is an
aggregate, a nebulous set, a multiplicity whose exact definition escapes
us, and whose local movements are beyond observation. A flame is an
aggregate.... Heat and flame, cloud and wind, climate and turbulence, we
could refer to them as concepts for multiplicities. We are, now, well
enough prepared by our sciences to be able to conceive them in their
unanalyzable complexity" (103).¶ While social aggregates tend toward
unity, stability, and toward closure ("n+1") (Deleuze and
Guattari call this process "molarization"), a true aggregate should be an
open system, which is why one has to stress dissention (one might think
here of Lyotard) and diversity. As Paul Cilliers states in
Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems
(New York: Routledge, 1998), "just as the flow of energy is
necessary to fight entropy and maintain the complex structure of the
system, society can only survive as process" (122). [11]
-
Serres takes up the basic tenet of
chaos
theory, namely that every order is only a spatial and temporal island in a
turbulent sea of disorder and multiplicity, when he states that the
universe itself is "an immense fractal turbulence, a global turbulence of
large, medium, small... microscopic turbulences" (106-7) and thus "a mix
of order and disorder" (107). As David Ruelle and others have shown,
turbulence is "an intermediary state, and also an aggregate mix.... Chaos
appears there, spontaneously, in the order, order appears there in the
midst of disorder.... The turbulent state mixes or associates the one and
the multiple, systematic gathering together and distribution" (109).
Oscillating between "lawful determinism and undeterminism" (109), it is a
field that cannot be thought by classical science ("Here, classical
science reigns, there, the new tree of multiplicities fluctuates" [109]),
and that cannot be described in reference to linear, reversible time
("Here, time is in legal expectation, there, our uncertainties waft along
on forecasts, in the meteorological sense" [109]).¶ As "turbulence is
a median state between a slightly redundant order and pure chaos" (121),
it can be described as "a chaotic multiplicity of orderly or unitary
multiplicities and chaotic multiplicities" (110). Ultimately, therefore,
"the cosmos is not a structure, it is a pure multiplicity of ordered
multiplicities and pure multiplicities" (111). In the science wars, then,
the voice of order might not have the final word: "It is always assumed
that multiplicities can, through various procedures, be eliminated. I
assume that they cannot be, I find that they cannot be and I hope that
they are not" (128). [12]
- One of Serres's examples to describe
the process of rational conceptualization involves the mathematical
differentiation between flux and fluxion (the one processual and analog,
the other static and digital). In this, he draws on Leibniz's introduction
of differential calculus into science, an introduction that has caused
science to describe "pornographies of flight."¶ "Fluent" is Newton's
term for variable. The aim is to find the rate of change of a variable, or
in Newton's wording "the fluxion of a given fluent." Fluxions are plotted
on graphs, such as the function y = x². Newton thought of the graph of a
function as a curve generated by a moving point P (x, y). As P traces the
curve both the x and the y coordinates continuously vary with time: time
itself was thought to "flow" at a uniform rate--hence the word
fluent. Newton now set out to find the rates of change of x and y
with respect to time--that is, their fluxions. This he did, as Dedekind
did with his famous "cut," by (1) considering the difference, or change,
in the values of x and y between two "adjacent" instances and then (2)
dividing this difference by the elapsed time interval. The final, crucial
step was to set the elapsed time interval equal to zero--or, more
precisely, to think of it as so small as to be negligible. In Serres's
words: "The differential of the flux is the fluxion. So the flux is a
sum, and classical rationality is safe, I am going from the local,
fluxion, to the global, flux, and conversely. Be advised: flux is a
multiplicity of fluctuations. So flux is unintegrable, it is not a sum,
the path from the global to the local and back can be cut. I am praying
for a completely new calculus for fluctuations, a different rationality
remains to be conceived" (65).¶ Via the logic of infinitesimal
calculus, rational thought claims to provide a smooth passage from the
local (particular) to the global (universal). Through breaking up the
global flux into particular fluxions, it claims that it can penetrate all
matter "through what is undoubtedly the most brilliant operation of all
time, the differentiation: we get fluxion, or a differential of flux. A
fluxion is a fraction of a flux as minimally different from the flux as
much as possible [sic], apart from size and order. The fluxion
vanishes as the flux flows along, fluxion drifts off as flux goes by. The
flux is at all points self-coded. Hence the open path from the local to
the global. Hence the simplest of methods, open through automorphism"
(99). As opposed to this cutting up and confluencing, Serres advocates a
thought that surfs on the pure processual and the fluxional: "the tip of
the crest of the swell, now that is what a fluctuation is.... The
noise,... the surge, is a multiplicity of which we do not know the sum
[again, the rhizomatic state that Deleuze & Guattari denote as
n-1]" (67). [13]
-
Serres stays within the
fluid-dynamical
reference when he uses the image of the thalweg, which denotes the
Lucretian inclination, to describe the trajectory of growing order and
confluence: "The downstream course, the worn-out path, the slope, the
chreod, run, from upstream confluences to downstream confluences, toward
synthesis and the unitary" (17). Given such an ordering confluence, it is
only by either going uphill, and thus negentropically, or by tilting the
complete plane that multiplexity can once more come into being, because
"the upstream course... multiplies its bifurcations" (17). Given the
"historical" implication of the thalweg, Serres defines the passage from
openness to closure as a fight of the old vs. the young; a designation
that can be applied to a young republic as well: "The more the human body
is young and the more it is possible, the more it is capable of
multiplicity, and the more time it has... the more variety of river beds
it has to flow down.... The entire volume of the old body is occupied by
archives, museums, traces, narratives" (32-3). Becoming more and more
inflexible, static and bound by the exoskeleton of language, "our body
comes down time.... It runs fatally along determination" (35).¶ In
this context, Serres once more differentiates between rational, linear
time and a multiplex time, which consists of multiple temporal
fluctuations: "Time is the positive infinitude of possible determinations.
It is the omnitude of novelties. Time is not, as a rule, a line, although
it may become one, and then start selecting, sorting, eliminating, getting
all at once bushier and bushier with bifurcations: another time on top of
time, appears; time, nonlinear, is, most often, a sheet [narrative plane,
page] or field" (115). Ultimately, time--every moment:event--is an
aggregate n-1 because "time... is not a flux that can be
differentiated into tiny little fluxions... it is, for the most part, a
sumless aggregate, a bundle of dispersed fluctuations" (116). As so often
in contemporary thought, the parts are more than their sum. [14]
-
What underlies meaning is the pure
noise of
the moment, the sheer complexity and potentiality of the undifferentiated
and undifferentiable "now." This is a time without binarisms, because "the
noise has no contrary. The space of the noise has no
complementary, no outside" (62). This noise can be reached only when the
subject stops being a sorting and coding Maxwell's Demon. Serres evokes
this regression through an image easily transferable to a scene on the
American prairies: "On the plain a noise arises. A door and a direction, a
semiconduction ["I am a semiconductor, I admit it, I am the demon" (66)]
and a way, a receiver, a Maxwell's demon. The wind does not perhaps quite
come whencesoever it will. In the beginning, then, is the bifurcation"
(63). Of course this question is also eminently literary ("Can we imagine
a chaotic and primal multiple with respect to knowledge, a confused
murmur, a noise that precedes and underlies the classified
encyclopedia?" [100]) and eminently political ("How much disorder is
necessary for living beings [and] for history?" [132]). In terms of
language, this regression implies a return, through language's function of
naming, to once more unnamed words: "In the beginning are nameless words,
verbs without nouns... this fractal complexity is a trace of the multiple,
the real multiple, different in every aspect.... The multiple moves, that
is all. In the beginning is the multiple: it rushes around" (101). Such
words move around freely, playing "mindless games" (outside of the agenda
of production and of meaning, and, of course, outside of agenda of
the production of meaning), like children do when they become sheer
movement. It is through these incomputable, improbable moments that
"newness enters the world," because they are moments of possibility and of
surprise. As Serres notes, "if we are alive, it is because we know,
because we hope that the unforeseeable will happen, that it will be
unconnected to what is already there" (134). [15]
-
Ultimately, the Serrian project
calls for the attempt chiastically to cross order and disorder rather than
to think in binarisms; to "extricate... [oneself] from the hell of
dualism.... The one is in the multiple and chaos is in order" (131-2). It
is in this concern that his poetics are at the most acute.
Rather than opting for simplifications and separations, he evokes a field
of thought defined by complexity. Similar to the "ecosophy" that
Félix Guattari advocates in Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic
Paradigm (Trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1995), Serres's philosophy is an intricate machine that maps
chaos theory (the theory of complexity), the history of science,
philosophy, and art. The "space of thought" created by this machine is a
philosophical mobile in which, as in Marcel Duchamp's Unhappy
Ready-Made, static geometrics (as a figure of the static, fully
rational sciences that Serres is so often writing about and criticizing in
the name of complexity) are suspended into the weather of life. The latter
consists of an edition of Euclid's Elements, which Duchamp
gave to his sister as a wedding gift with the instruction to suspend it
from her balcony by a thread. Through this suspension of the very emblem
of Euclidean geometry into the turbulent space of the climate--the
suspension of "the elements" into "the elements"--the book, and with it
science, becomes a true mobile. In this context, Serres's books are not
asking for a return to a state of irrationality, but for a new rationality
that shows respect to and that incorporates into its project the
unpredictabilities, the probabilities (symptomatically, in the newspapers
around the turn of the century, the weather forecast used to be called
"the probabilities"), and the complexities and the "emergent" character of
the world. They ultimately
ask for an in-itself turbulent and complex rationality, and thus for a new
contract with nature. [16]
Dept. of American Literature and Culture
University of Cologne
hanjo.berressem@uni-koeln.de
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