Review of:
James Elkins, Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern Origins
of Pictorial Complexity. New York and London:
Routledge, 1999.
-
The Tempest (La tempestad), a 1997 best-selling
Spanish novel by Juan Manuel de Prada, not only borrows its title from
the 1508 painting by Giorgione, but also places the masterpiece canvas at
the center of a complex detective plot that involves art forgery, love,
betrayal, and murder. Alejandro Ballesteros, the novel's main character,
is an art history student who, after years of intensive studies, comes to
Venice to examine the famous painting, the topic of his doctoral
dissertation. Although the novel's opening page includes a color
reproduction of the painting, and the first chapter briefly describes
what art historians refer to as its basic sensus litteralis, the
author devotes much of chapter eight to explaining the complexities of
the daunting task his fictitious art history student faces: the need to
reconcile into a coherent whole many, often contradictory,
interpretations of the painting and his frustrating inability to
unequivocally "fix" the meaning of even its most visually prominent
characters and elements. In a reflection on the nature of this
interpretive process, the young art historian Ballesteros
compares his task to the process of assembling a complex jigsaw puzzle:
It takes a numismatic patience to arrange the pieces of a puzzle. One has
to decide continually between an almost infinite number of possible
combinations, and to try and match the bite-shaped pieces together. And
although sometimes the connections between them are so subtle as to be
almost evanescent, and our intuition tells us that a simple error of
judgment could just as easily destroy the tenuous link, we chase this
thought away, and we continue tenaciously.... It's not enough to fit the
pieces together, however, we also have to make sure that the resulting
image is plausible. (Prada 185)
- As it turns out, in his concerns regarding the
complexity of pictorial images, and the extent of critical writings about
them, the fictitious art historian from Prada's novel is not alone: the
reflection on the interpretive process that addresses images, such as
Giorgione's Tempest, as well as the picture-as-puzzle
metaphor itself (inspired by Salvatore Setti's book on Giorgione), are
both also at the center of James Elkins's metatheoretical 1999 inquiry
into the mechanisms that underlie present-day art historical discourse,
tellingly titled Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? On the Modern
Origins of Pictorial Complexity.
- Elkins's point of departure, and the basic premise of
his argument, a premise which he quickly and convincingly proves in the
opening chapters, is that while "once upon a time, pictures were simple,"
over the last century they have invariably grown more "difficult to
explain," "demanding," and "puzzling" (xi). This opening statement is not
quite accurate, since what concerns Elkins is the fact that academic
approaches to pictures and, consequently, academic writing about them,
not pictures themselves, have changed dramatically over the last century.
- Following Wittgenstein's maxim that "the first step in
seeing a problem is seeing that it is a problem" (xi), Elkins endeavors
to outline its nature and extent in both qualitative and quantitative
terms. To outline the main direction of the trend, he examines a somewhat
extreme, and therefore conveniently self-evident example of a monograph
by Birger Carlström, who claims that many popular Impressionist
paintings, usually taken to be expressions of the new, modern age
aesthetic, are teeming with extensive, and often cryptically encoded
political messages, hidden in the outlines, signatures, fabric folds, or
even minute paint spots so small as to be discernible only under a
magnifying glass. In several examples of pictorial exegesis run amok,
Carlström reads Renoir's political concerns about the Panama Canal
project from his paintings, or rather into them, as Elkins, supported by
extensive art-historical consensus, points out. Carlström claims to
have identified messages such as "stop stupid England at Suez Canal,"
allegedly engraved with a needle in one painting, or cartographic
outlines of the canal in several of Renoir's paintings generally
considered to be charming, but otherwise conservatively bourgeois
portraits. As Elkins notes, there is no existing additional evidence,
such as correspondence or other written documents, to support or
corroborate Carlström's unusual interpretive claims.
- The extent of the "complexity problem," however, does
not exclusively affect the isolated and contested margins of pictorial
interpretation. Even in those mainstream art history texts which reflect
wide consensus in the field, and where the enormous geographic and
chronological scope limits the space devoted to each single art object to
a minimum, as is the case in Janson's popular and extensive History
of Art, the complexity of interpretation is still evident to
Elkins. He points out that the existence of extensive additional
interpretive information, while not necessarily included explicitly in
such texts, is clearly implied or acknowledged in them.
- Having outlined the general nature of the problem in
qualitative terms, Elkins also traces the chronological development of
art-historical exegesis, and provides extensive textual support for the
claim that traditional ekphrases, dating from antiquity to about
a century ago, are generally short, and that their authors almost never
ventured beyond the sketchy, verbal descriptions of the paintings' most
immediately visible content (sensus litteralis), their narrative
foundations (fabula, or dramatic ekphrasis, in Elkins's terms),
or, in the case of religious paintings, their spiritual meaning
(sensus spiritualis). Elkins sees the relatively recent
explosion of interpretive complexity as an urgent theoretical issue that
needs to be addressed, and observes that "as historians and viewers, we
tend not to reflect on why we understand pictures the way we do" (35).
Thus it would be hard not to notice that in a way the book and its
author's arguments are very fittingly inscribed within the postmodern
debate on the mechanisms of legitimizing our knowledge, and in this case,
the art historical discourse in particular.
- The anatomy of pictorial complexity, however, and
especially its genesis, is not very simple. Elkins hypothesizes that it
is our present-day "aversion to mere description, or the apparently
simpleminded praise of illusion" (39), that leads to endless
bibliographies that have accumulated not only around certain paintings,
but even around the meaning of specific individual objects depicted in
them. The "buried mirror," to use the term coined by Carlos Fuentes, in
Velázquez's Las Meninas is a perfect case in point.
Understood for centuries as little more than just a reflection of the
Spanish royal couple, with Michel Foucault's essay the painting was
"pressed into service as a reflection of fragmented Western epistemology"
and treated ever since as "the representation, as it were of classical
representation" (39). And while Elkins himself contributed an elaborate
diagrammatic analysis of the painting's complex perspective that
accompanied Joel Snyder's 1985 article on the emblematic meanings of the
mirror in the Spanish masterpiece, he readily admits that the diagram's
analytic precision and the logical exactitude of the argument that it
accompanied are distinctly "foreign to Velázquez's contemporary
reception" (40). So might be dozens of other present-day studies of the
painting, whose authors see the mirror as a catalyst for "'narcissistic'
reflections on self reflection" (Mieke Bal), as a "hypericon" and
"metapicture"--i.e., a painting that represents picturing itself (W. J. T.
Mitchell)--or even as "a representation of Lacan's register of the
Symbolic" (Pierre-Gilles Guéguen) (40).
- Other examples of the objects whose presence in
paintings has recently generated equally extensive and complex exegetic
commentary include open doors, which formerly "seemed self-explanatory to
generations of writers before the twentieth century" (42); shoes, a
prominent point of reference in Jacques Derrida's "Restitutions of the
Truth in Painting"; and checkerboard floors, as well as the basic
perspective box that underlies the construction of many pictorial spaces
(43). Elkins is eager to stress that he does not believe those critical
interpretive excursions are "inane or inherently wrong headed," but
rather that they constitute "the shape of pictures as we understand them
today" (44), and that the increased interest in some paintings, or the
critically underscored relevance of some objects in them, is a reflection
of the importance of their commentators to the general intellectual tenor
of our times, a point aptly made with a rhetorical question: "How
interesting are Van Gogh's paintings of shoes, outside Heidegger and
Derrida?" (45). By contrast, Elkins also defines a category of paintings
which fail to attract wider exegetic interest, and, since they are not
compositionally engaging, "offer little purchase for an historian intent
on locating intellectual content" (53). Since they seem to "call for a
nonverbal, unanalyzed kind of contemplation" (54), they are usually
excluded from verbal analyses. For Elkins, few art historians are aware
of this exclusionary bias, even when it is patently visible in their own
writing.
- The emphasis on the intellectual content of paintings
makes Salvatore Setti's interpretive picture-as-puzzle metaphor (from his
book on Giorgione) particularly attractive to Elkins. In fact, several
central chapters of his book include extensive and copiously illustrated
critical evaluations of existing taxonomies of puzzle types (both in the
metaphoric and in the literal sense) and of different degrees, modes, and
types of ambiguities.
- While for present-day art historical discourse the
potential for pictorial complexity and ambiguity seems to be a prized
characteristic, too much of a good thing occasionally makes a critical
evaluation of existing research impossible. This leads Elkins to describe
one category of images as "monstrously ambiguous paintings" (123). Three
prime examples of this category are Giorgione's Tempesta,
Botticelli's Primavera, and Michelangelo's Sistine Ceiling,
since in each case "so much has been said about each of them that the
history of their reception can no longer be fully told" (124). The
paintings that are thought to be intentionally ambiguous are especially
good candidates for the category, and even more so if their primary
subject and meanings are unclear and cannot be determined to be either
self-evident or reasonably well deduced from existing historical sources.
Giorgione's Tempesta is a perfect example, exactly because
there is no consensus on the painting's primary meanings. To "evoke the
tenor of the literature" (131), Elkins lists a long series of recently
proposed interpretive solutions, ranging from very specific
identifications of the painting's characters with those of various
literary, mythological, biblical, or hagiographic fabulae, to the claims
that Tempesta indeed is, and always has been intended to
evade unambiguous attributions of meaning, and that it really is a
painting without a subject (130-37).
- Picking up the line of thought about Carlström's
marginal exegeses from the introductory pages of the book, Elkins devotes
an entire chapter to cryptomorphs--hidden images, in many cases
arguably read into the pictures as a result of modern day, often
anachronistic interpretations. And, as Elkins himself admits, while in
some cases, such as Freud's famous misreading of a vulture into
Leonardo's Virgin and Child with St. Anne (205), errors can
be easily explained away (a translation error, in this case). Other
hypotheses, such as Meshberger's claim of two brain views embedded in
Michelangelo's Sistine Ceiling (Elkins 209), can be argued against only
tentatively, and the multiplicity and complexity of arguments that have
to be brought to bear on this case, ironically, dilute the argument,
instead of lending credibility to it.
- Elkins's tour-de-force journey through exegetic samples,
whether of exemplary logical coherence, or marginal, bizarre, and
non-corroborated interpretive claims, concludes with an envoi which
contains a handy summary of his answers to the questions posed in the
title of the book, Why Are Our Pictures Puzzles? Elkins's
own initial hypothesis that the increase in our knowledge, the growth of
the discipline, and new insights are responsible for the complex ways we
read pictures, is ultimately determined by him to be unsatisfactory.
It is surprising to realize, however, that while Elkins considers a wide
range of possible causes in his effort to account for the rise in the
complexity of writing about pictures, he tends to leave out more mundane
causes external to art history as a discipline. Ironically, the reason
for this exclusion may be that those possible external causes are not as
complex
as the internal ones Elkins discusses at length, and therefore are of less
interest to a scholar. Technological advances in art reproduction come to
mind as a potentially powerful impulse for that type of change, an impulse
not considered by Elkins. One could hypothesize that, since in the past
the reading audience had limited access to the works of art in question,
it was necessary to resort to frequent basic description, but in today's
world, where detailed color reproductions of thousands of paintings are
easily available to the public, the reason for simple description has been
eliminated, leaving a void to be filled with more complex arguments.
Similarly, the academic pressure on many researchers to publish
extensively and frequently has led many actively to seek out niche areas
that have not yet been explored, especially if their work is concerned
with periods and works that have already accumulated an extensive body of
theoretical commentary.
- Elkins's book remains a valuable reflection on the
mechanisms that set the directions of contemporary academic discourse, and
while his specific concern here is art history, many of his observations
clearly apply to other humanistic disciplines, as well--and in particular
to literary studies.
Foreign Languages and Literatures
Iowa State University
GeorgeOJ@aol.com
COPYRIGHT (c) 2001 BY JERZY O. JURA.
READERS MAY USE PORTIONS
OF THIS WORK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAIR USE PROVISIONS OF U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW. IN ADDITION, SUBSCRIBERS AND MEMBERS OF SUBSCRIBED INSTITUTIONS MAY
USE THE ENTIRE WORK FOR ANY INTERNAL NONCOMMERCIAL PURPOSE BUT, OTHER THAN
ONE COPY SENT BY EMAIL, PRINT OR FAX TO ONE PERSON AT ANOTHER LOCATION FOR
THAT INDIVIDUAL'S PERSONAL USE, DISTRIBUTION OF THIS ARTICLE OUTSIDE OF A
SUBSCRIBED INSTITUTION WITHOUT EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION FROM EITHER THE
AUTHOR OR THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS IS EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN.
THIS ARTICLE AND OTHER CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE ARE
AVAILABLE FREE OF CHARGE UNTIL RELEASE OF THE NEXT ISSUE. A
TEXT-ONLY ARCHIVE OF THE JOURNAL IS ALSO AVAILABLE FREE OF CHARGE. FOR
FULL HYPERTEXT ACCESS TO BACK ISSUES, SEARCH UTILITIES, AND OTHER VALUABLE
FEATURES, YOU OR YOUR INSTITUTION MAY SUBSCRIBE TO
PROJECT MUSE, THE
ON-LINE JOURNALS PROJECT OF THE JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS.
|