In the end it was they who did it but we who wished it. If we do not
take this into account, the event loses all symbolic dimension; it
becomes a purely arbitrary act. . . . (A)nd in their strategic symbolism
the terrorists knew they could count on this unconfessable complicity.
Terrorism is the act that restores an irreducible singularity to the
heart of a generalized system of exchange.
The globe itself is resistant to globalization.
--Jean Baudrillard[1]
-
From Princess Diana to 9/11, Jean Baudrillard has been the prophet
of the postmodern media spectacle, the hyperreal event. In the 1970s and
80s, our collective fascination with things like car crashes, dead
celebrities, terrorists and hostages was a major theme in Baudrillard's
work on the symbolic and symbolic exchange, and in his post-9/11 "L'Esprit
du Terrorisme," he has taken it upon himself to decipher terrorism's
symbolic message. He does so in the wake of such scathing critiques
as Douglas Kellner's Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to
Postmodernism and Beyond (1989), which attacked Baudrillard's
theory as "an imaginary construct which tries to seduce the world to
become as theory wants it to be, to follow the scenario scripted in the
theory" (178). Did Baudrillard seduce 9/11 into being--is he terrorism's
theoretical guru?--or did he merely anticipate and describe in advance
the event's profound seductiveness?
-
To Kellner and other critics, Baudrillard's theory of postmodernity is a
political as well as an intellectual failure:
Losing critical energy and growing apathetic himself, he ascribes apathy
and inertia to the universe. Imploding into entropy, Baudrillard
attributes implosion and entropy to the experience of (post) modernity.
(180)
To be sure, Baudrillard's scripts and scenarios have always been
concerned with the implosion of the global capitalist system. But
while Baudrillard's tone at the end of "L'Esprit du Terrorisme"
can certainly be called apathetic--"there is no solution to this extreme
situation--certainly not war"--he does not suggest that there are no
forces in the universe capable of mounting at least a challenge to the
system and its sponsors (18). -
As in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) and Simulacra
and Simulations (1981), Baudrillard again suggests that terrorism
is one such force, and that it functions according to the rule of symbolic
exchange. Terrorism can be carried out in theoretical/aesthetic terms,
the terms Baudrillard would obviously prefer, or in real terms, that is,
involving the real deaths of real people, a misfortune Baudrillard warns
against.[2] Though he states clearly "I
am a terrorist and nihilist in theory as the others are with their
weapons," he is characteristically ambivalent in relation to "real"
terrorism, since the real is always in question, and perhaps also because
ambivalence is Baudrillard's own brand of theoretical terrorism
(Simulacra 163). One moment of his thought is the utopian
dream of radicality and reversal, a revolution of symbolic exchange
against the system, and the other moment is one of profound pessimism:
"The system...has the power to pour everything, including what denies it,
into indifference."
-
In Simulacra and
Simulations (1981), Baudrillard wrote that systemic nihilism and
the mass media are to blame for the postmodern human condition, which he
describes as a combination of "fascination," "melancholy," and
"indifference." Against the system and its passive nihilism, Baudrillard
proffers his own brand of what might be termed active nihilism,
a praxis that includes theoretical and aesthetic "terrorism," but not, in
the end, the
bloody acts of actual violence his theory accounts for. The terrorist
acts of 9/11, as his theory predicted, were destined to be absorbed by
the system's own narrative, neutralized by the very mass media they
sought to exploit.
-
In "L'Esprit," Baudrillard nevertheless attempts to explain again the
logic, the spirit, of terrorism and to account for its power. Two of the
three letters written to Harper's Magazine after its February
2002 printing of "L'Esprit" would, predictably, take Baudrillard to be an
apologist for the terrorists' means and ends. Edward B. Schlesinger and
Sarah A. Wersan of Santa Barbara, California, write:
Embedded in Jean Baudrillard's almost incomprehensible prose is the
shocking assertion that terrorism is justifiable, that the threat of
globalization, as visualized by Baudrillard, justified the World Trade
Center attack. (Kelly et al. 4)
Average Harper's readers may be spared blame for not
comprehending Baudrillard's theoretical prose, but the point of
"L'Esprit" is not that 9/11 was justifiable in any moral sense, but that,
as Nietzsche held, true justice must end in its "self-overcoming"
(Genealogy 73). Baudrillard explicitly states that "if we
hope to understand anything we will need to get beyond Good and Evil"
("L'Esprit" 15). In light of his past writings, I suggest that his
unspoken stand on the issue of justice concerning 9/11 would have to be
what Nietzsche's would have been: that there is no justice, only
forgiveness, and only the strong can forgive. But Baudrillard does not
explicitly state this claim, which I see as an implicit conclusion to his
thought. Instead he plays the provocateur by laying claim to
the terrorists' logic, which was their greatest weapon. If, as Kellner
would have it, Baudrillard wants to seduce us into following his script,
we must be sure to understand the script well so we can decide how to act
on it. The fact that 9/11 was arguably the most potent symbolic
event since the crucifixion of Christ has inspired Baudrillard to dress
up his old ideas about the symbolic and symbolic exchange. To understand
what he means by "symbolic dimension" and "strategic symbolism" in the
quotation from "L'Esprit" above, let us consult the origins and uses of
the concept of the symbolic in his earlier work.
Baudrillard's Symbolic and Death
-
Baudrillard's theory of the symbolic serves as a response to what he saw
as the metaphysical underpinnings of the Marxist, Freudian and
structuralist traditions. All three, he claims, uphold the fetishization
of the "law of value," a bifurcating, metaphysical projection of the
mind which allows us to measure the worth of things. The law of value
effectively produces "reality" in each system as both its effect and its
alibi. For Marx this reality, this metaphysical claim, was found in the
concept of use value, for Freud it was the unconscious, and for Saussure
it was the signified (and ultimately the referent). According to
Baudrillard, any critical theory in the name of such projected "real"
values ultimately reinforces the fetishized relations it criticizes. He
therefore relocates the law of value within his own Nietzsche-styled
history of the "image"--a term used as a stand-in for all that the words
representation, reproduction, and simulation have in common. In "How the
'True' World Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error," Nietzsche
outlines in six concise steps the decline of western metaphysics and its
belief in a "True world" of essences, beyond the Imaginary world of
appearances (Portable 485). Baudrillard's four-part history
of the image (commonly referred to as his four orders of simulation)
closely mirrors Nietzsche's history of the "'True' World":
- it [the image] is the reflection of a profound reality;
- it masks and denatures a profound reality;
- it masks the absence of a profound reality;
- it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure
simulacrum. (Simulacra 6)
Marx, Freud and Saussure were stuck in the second order, where the
critique of appearances was thought to yield a glimpse of a deeper
reality. We have since turned from the critique of appearances to the
critique of meaning and of reality itself (the third order), and from
here can only enter into the fourth order, the hyperreal. This is
because we live in profoundly mediated environments, wherein coded images
are produced and exchanged far more than material goods, and the more
these codes are exchanged throughout the culture, the more erratically
their values fluctuate, until at last they can no longer be traced to
their origins. Hyperreality thus describes the extreme limit of
fetishization, wherein re-presentation eclipses reality. Here the
spectacle continues to fascinate, but indifference is the attitude du
jour (indifference having long been associated with the
postmodern). But Baudrillard's history, it seems, has one more step to
take before it completes its circle. Baudrillard imagines that from within the fourth order, where
all metaphysical distinctions of value have disappeared,
there will emerge a type of postmodern primitivism (I propose to call
it), which he outlines in his conceptions of the symbolic and symbolic
exchange. -
Baudrillard's symbolic derives loosely from Mauss's analysis of the
Potlatch, Bataille's theory of expenditure, and a deconstruction
of Lacan's symbolic/real/imaginary triad. For Lacan, the symbolic marks
the adult world of discourse, wherein the subject comes fully into being
as it leaves the narcissistic fantasies of the imaginary order to
recognize, and be recognized by, the other. Entry into the symbolic,
however, also severs the subject from "the real" or material "given,"
which always remains beyond the reach of signification. The symbolic for
Lacan plays a balancing act between the demands of a lost imaginary and a
lost real, while for Baudrillard "the effect of the real is only
ever . . . the structural effect of the disjunction between two terms"
(Symbolic 133). The real and the imaginary are not lost
causes, but rather lost effects of consciousness, and the
symbolic is that within a social exchange which is irreducible to the
real/imaginary dichotomy:
The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a
"structure," but an act of exchange and a social relation which puts
an end to the real, which resolves the real, and, at the same time,
puts an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary. (133)
When we enter the Baudrillardian symbolic dimension, the biased
distinctions of Western metaphysics--Cause/Effect, Being/Nothingness,
Real/Imaginary, Normal/Abnormal, Good/Evil--are to be considered
deconstructed, over-come in the French Nietzschean tradition of the
aesthetic turn. The symbolic is Baudrillard's trope for the revaluation
of all values, jenseits von Gut und Bose, a revolutionary theory
for the age of digital reproduction and the generalized aesthetic
sphere. In the Baudrillardian symbolic, one hears the echo of
Nietzsche's merriment at the end of metaphysics: "pandemonium of all free
spirits" (Portable 486). The "death drive" in Baudrillard
is therefore not a matter of a repressed instinct (Freud), nor even yet
of a universal force within language (Lacan), but of an incipient
implosion of "the code," which stands for all terms and forces valued in
opposition within the system. In the wake of his implosionary vision
Baudrillard hopes will arise, at least in theory, a liberated and
continuously creative new set of relations, governed not by semiotic or
economic codes, but by the principle of symbolic exchange. -
In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the
Sign, Baudrillard harkens back to the "primitive" notion of the
symbol as transparent, binding, and potentially brutal in its demands (he
does not qualify the term primitive, and after all it is the model that
is important to him, whether his generalizations are accurate or a
projection of desire[3]). This would-be
dark side of Baudrillard's symbolic stems from what he himself calls a
dangerous allusion to primitive societies in Mauss's illustrations of the
Kula and the Potlatch (Critique 30).
Mauss describes the primitive practice of Potlatch as involving
an agonistic exchange of gifts between two chieftains in which each one
seeks to gain standing for himself and his clan through gift exchange
(Mauss 6). Baudrillard clarifies that
the gift is unique, specified by the people exchanging and the unique
moment of the exchange. It is arbitrary [in that it matters little what
object is involved], and yet absolutely singular.
As distinct from language, whose material can be disassociated
from the subjects speaking it, the material of symbolic exchange, the
objects given, are not autonomous, hence not codifiable as signs.
(Critique 64-65)
The symbolic value of a gift or of any gesture depends upon the
involuntary consciousness of the fact that the consciousness of the other
poses a singular challenge to our own. And we cannot not
respond to this challenge, once we have received it, because even
ignoring someone or something is a way of responding. The gift
represents a qualitative measurement of honor or disgrace between two
parties and in that sense is symbolic, but it is also symbolic in
Baudrillard's other sense, that is, as standing only for itself, as a
unique and ineluctable challenge to counter give. It takes a certain
amount of Orwellian doublethink to ignore the challenge represented by
the other once we have grasped the reciprocal nature of our fates. For
Baudrillard's and Mauss's "primitives," events such as the Potlatch
involve conspicuous consumption and expenditure, a sumptuous wasting of
goods that turns out in the end to be essentially usurious and sumptuary
(see Critique 30, Mauss 6).
- Baudrillard formulates the term "prestation" with regard to Mauss
to signify that within our social exchanges which makes us feel obligated
to "an irrational code of social behavior," namely the law of symbolic
exchange (Critique 30, n. 4). This mechanism of social
prestation, says Baudrillard, adheres to every exchange and is fraught
with ambivalence, for in it lies "the value . . . of rivalry and, at the
limit, of class discriminants" (Critique 31). Symbolic
exchange, at some level, always involves an agonistic struggle for
domination and status. Baudrillard does not issue a moral judgment on
the matter of social domination, but rather suggests that symbolic
exchange will continue to haunt our political economies:
Behind all the superstructures of purchase, market, and private
property, there is always the mechanism of social prestation which must
be recognized in our choice, our accumulation, our manipulation and our
consumption of objects. This mechanism of discrimination and prestige is
at the very basis of the system of values and of integration into the
hierarchical order of society. The Kula and the
Potlatch have disappeared, but not their principle. (30)
The symbolic value of commodities--the connotations of wearing a certain
brand of basketball shoe or driving a certain car--are seen here as
barbaric in the social relations they imply. And so Baudrillard warns in
an interview:
If we take to dreaming once more--particularly today--of a world where
signs are certain, of a strong "symbolic order," let's be under no
illusions. For this order has existed, and it was a brutal hierarchy,
since the sign's transparency is indissociably also its cruelty.
(Baudrillard Live 50)
One nevertheless senses in this disavowal of the primitive symbolic
order, where signs were singular and binding, a hint of admiration,
echoing Nietzsche's musings on the cruel but proud days when power was
signified outright, and not behind the guises of morality.[4]
-
Despite this transparent warning, in Symbolic Exchange and
Death (1976) Baudrillard went on to sketch several examples of
symbolic exchange in relation to death in today's political economy. The
anagram in Saussure, the Witz in Freud, graffiti in New York, the
Accident in the media are all treated by Baudrillard as symbolic events
wherein death, denied and repressed, poses a challenge to life. From the
standpoint of 9/11, his theory of death in primitive and modern cultures
is most pertinent. Like Foucault, Baudrillard sees the history of Western
culture in terms of a genealogy of discrimination and exclusion:
At the very core of the "rationality" of our culture, however, is an
exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of
madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and
serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death.
(Symbolic 126)
According to Baudrillard, the dead in primitive societies played integral
roles in the lives of the living by serving as partners in symbolic
exchange. A gift to the dead was believed to yield a return, and by
exchanging with the dead through ritual sacrifices, celebrations and
feasts, they managed to absorb the rupturing energy of death back into
the group. But
there is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own:
little by little, the dead cease to exist. They are thrown out of the
group's symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full role
to play, worthy partners in exchange....Today it is not normal to be
dead, and this is new. . . . Death is a delinquency, and an incurable
deviancy. (126)
Modern Western cultures have largely ceased to exchange with the dead
collectively, partly because we no longer believe in their continued
existence, and partly because we no longer value that which cannot be
accumulated or consumed. The dead have no value by our measurements. We
give them nothing and expect nothing from them in return, and yet they
remain with us, in our memories, obligating our recognition and
response. How do we respond to the symbolic challenge of death and the
dead, the challenge they pose to our conscious experience? This is the
question of 9/11. -
The primitives, Baudrillard maintains, responded to this challenge
collectively through symbolic exchanges with their dead and deities.
Their belief in the sign's transparency, its symbolic singularity, can be
seen in animistic practices such as voodoo, where the enemy's hair is
thought to contain his or her spirit. If the dead are only humans of a
different nature, and if the sign is what it stands for, then a symbolic
sacrifice to a dead person is every bit as binding as a gift to a living
person. The obligation to return is placed upon the dead, and they
reciprocate by somehow honoring or benefiting the living. Most
Christians believe in and employ this same mechanism when they pray to
the resurrected Christ, but even they do not believe that their symbolic
gestures are anything but metaphors. We no longer believe in the one to
one correspondence of signifier and signified, and we know the loved one
is not really contained in the lock of hair. Americans will doubtless
commemorate the deaths of those killed on 9/11 as long as our nation
exists, but we know that our gifts to the dead are only symbolic, which
for us means imaginary.
-
Baudrillard's postmodern-primitive symbolic, on the other hand,
aimed to obliterate the difference in value between the imaginary and the
real, the signifier and the signified, and to expose the metaphysical
prejudice at the heart of all such valuations. His wager was that this
would be done through aesthetic violence and not real violence, but
having erased the difference between the two, there was never any
guarantee that others wouldn't take such theoretical "violence" to its
literal ends. Graffiti art, scarification and tattooing are just the
benign counterparts of true terrorism, which takes ritual sacrifice and
initiation to their extremes. Literalists and extremists,
fundamentalists of all sorts, find their logic foretold in Baudrillard's
references to the primitives. What the terrorists enacted on 9/11 was
what Baudrillard would call a symbolic event of the first order, and they
were undeniably primitive in their belief that God, the dead, and the
living would somehow honor and benefit them in the afterlife. Unable to
defeat the U.S. in economic or military terms, they employ the rule of
prestation in symbolic exchange with the gift of their own deaths. But
Americans are not "primitives"--we do not value death symbolically, but
rather only as a subtraction from life. Capitalism's implicit promise,
in every ad campaign and marketing strategy, is that to consume is to
live. We score up life against death as gain against loss, as if through
accumulation we achieve mastery over the qualitative presence of death
that haunts life. Our official holidays honoring the dead serve no other
function than to encourage consumption.
-
When it comes to actually dealing with death and the dead, even
in public, we do so in private. As Baudrillard points out, "This entails
a considerable difference in enjoyment: we trade with our dead in a kind
of melancholy, while the primitives live with their dead under the
auspices of the ritual and the feast" (134-35). Because we devalue death
and thereby the dead, we view them only as a dreaded caste of
unfortunates, and not as continuing partners in exchange. Ultimately,
however, it is not so much the dead but our own deaths, our negative
doubles, that we insult by denying their value. When we posit death as
the negation of life, we bifurcate our identities and begin a process of
mourning over our own eventual deaths, a process which lasts our whole
lives. The more we devalue our death-imagoes, that is, the greater they
become, until they haunt our every moment, as in Don DeLillo's darkest
comedy, White Noise. This leads us, according to
Baudrillard, to an obsession with death that can be felt in the media
fascination with catastrophes like 9/11. Death "becomes the object of a
perverse desire. Desire invests the very separation of life and death"
(147). Political economy's inability to absorb the rupturing energy of
death is thus compensated by the symbolic yield of the media
catastrophe. In these events we experience an artificial death which
fascinates us, bored as we are by the routine order of the system and the
"natural" death it prescribes for us. Natural death represents an
unnegotiable negation of life and the tedious certainty of an unwanted
end. It therefore inspires insurrection, until "reason itself is
pursued by the hope of a universal revolt against its own norms and
privileges" (162). The terrorist spectacle is an example of such a
revolt, in which death gains symbolic distinction and becomes more than
simply "natural." We may not think we identify with the terrorists'
superstitions about honor in the next life, but in events like 9/11,
Baudrillard would suggest, we nevertheless identify despite ourselves
with both with the terrorists and their victims:
We are all hostages, and that's the secret of hostage-taking, and we are
all dreaming, instead of dying stupidly working oneself to the ground, of
receiving death and of giving death. Giving and receiving constitute one
symbolic act (the symbolic act par excellence), which rids death of all
the indifferent negativity it holds for us in the "natural" order of
capital. (166)
Violent, artificial death is a symbolic event witnessed collectively.
"Technical, non natural and therefore willed (ultimately by the victim
him- or herself), death becomes interesting once again since willed death
has a meaning" (165). Was 9/11 willed by the victims? Obviously not,
and yet, Baudrillard would suggest, in our identification with both the
killers and those who died, we ourselves are not so innocent.
Nihilism and Terrorism
Implosion of meaning in the media. Implosion of the social in the
masses. Infinite growth of the masses as a function of the acceleration
of the system. Energetic impasse. Point of inertia.
--Baudrillard (Simulacra 161)
- Baudrillard's most prescient statements regarding terrorism
and the spirit that motivates it were issued in the 1981 essay "On
Nihilism," which falls at the end of Simulacra and
Simulations. Here he distinguishes the first two great
manifestations of nihilism by placing them parallel to his second and
third orders of simulation. Recall:
- it [the image] is the reflection of a profound reality;
- it masks and denatures a profound reality;
- it masks the absence of a profound reality;
- it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure
simulacrum. (6)
The first wave of nihilism occurs in the second order of simulation, and
corresponds with the Enlightenment and Romantic revolutions against the
order of appearances, "the disenchantment of the world and its
abandonment to the violence of interpretation and of history"
(Simulacra 160). Nihilism is thus first and foremost, for
Baudrillard, the signature of the post-metaphysical philosopher. He thus
places Nietzsche's statement that "God is dead" at the center of all
modernity, but adds that once the critique of metaphysics has run its
course, a new type of nihilism is ushered in. "When God died, there was
still Nietzsche to say so," i.e., after God there is Nietzsche, after
Nietzsche, only simulation (159). "God is not dead, he has become
hyperreal." -
This second wave of nihilism occurs in the twentieth century and
spans the third and fourth orders of simulation, beginning with
"surrealism, dada, the absurd, and political nihilism" (159), which
sought to reveal the absence of a profound metaphysical reality behind
our representations, and ending in
postmodernity, which is the immense process of the destruction of
meaning, equal to the earlier destruction of appearances. He who strikes
with meaning is killed by meaning. (161)
After discovering the absence of a profound meaning behind the world of
appearances, those who seek the true meaning of things end up impaled on
the truth that there is no true meaning to be had. Nietzsche's dilemma.
And so Baudrillard boldly declares: "I am a nihilist," and swears himself
to the destruction of both appearance and meaning, the first two waves,
but also to the destruction of the appearance/meaning dichotomy
altogether, the postmodern phase of the second wave. If western culture
can now be characterized by Baudrillard's notion of a fourth order
simulation society, where simulacra dominate our lives and the faith in a
"profound reality" has turned radically agnostic, it is here that one
must plant one's (post-) philosophical flag. Rather than take the
reactionary approach of a return to metaphysics, Baudrillard affects a
nihilistic version of Nietzschean amor fati, accepting the
system's melancholy and pushing to its limit the "mode of disappearance"
it effects in everything it touches (162). The melancholy in Adorno and
Benjamin, holds Baudrillard, already stems from this recognition that
dis-enchantment, dis-appearance, the critique of reason itself are all
inherent to the system's functionality. But their "dialectic" was
already "nostalgic," their melancholy the last healthy pulse of
"ressentiment" against the systemization of death, a third order
phenomenon. Melancholia today, says Baudrillard, is no longer a matter
of disenchantment and demystification: "It is simply disappearance." No
longer an affect one can deploy in a critique of the system, it is now
the affect of "the brutal disaffection that characterizes our saturated
systems." -
Though Baudrillard does not deny melancholia as our appropriate
Zeitgeist, his implicit suggestion in the essay, which Kellner
neglects, is that the passive nihilism (inertia, entropy, implosion)
produced by the implicitly nihilistic system is the philosophical enemy,
which he means to challenge by means of his own brand of active nihilism:
"What then remains of a possible nihilism in theory? What new scene can
unfold, where nothing and death could be replayed as a
challenge, as a stake?" (159). The system has effectively
absorbed the first two waves of active, critical nihilism into its own
nihilism, and induces a state of stupefied, melancholic indifference
in the "receivers" (we are no longer spectators) of its mass mediations.
Baudrillard's strategy, then, is to push the system faster ("revenge of
speed on inertia"), to the point of its implosion, by writing theory that
is the equivalent of intellectual terrorism (161). All other theory at
this point only "assists in the freezing over of meaning, it assists in
the precession of simulacra and of indifferent forms. The desert grows"
(161). In the desert of the real, no amount of analysis can "resolve the
imperious necessity of checking the system in broad daylight. This, only
terrorism can do" (163). Terrorism, writes Baudrillard,
is the trait of reversion that effaces the remainder, just as a single
ironic smile effaces a whole discourse, just as a single flash of denial
in a slave effaces all the power and pleasure of the master.
The more hegemonic the system, the more the imagination is struck
by the smallest of its reversals. The challenge, even infinitesimal, is
the image of a chain failure. Only this reversibility without a
counterpart is an event today, on the nihilistic and disaffected stage of
the political. Only it mobilizes the imaginary.
This is of course what happened on 9/11, as Baudrillard has since pointed
out, but Kellner would also likely point out that Baudrillard, having
himself wished for 9/11, begins "L'Esprit" by projecting this wish onto
the rest of us (180). Our collective complicity in the wish is of course
impossible to gauge, but in "On Nihilism" Baudrillard had already confessed
his own complicity with nihilistic terrorism in the most carefully
calibrated terms:
If being a nihilist, is carrying, to the unbearable limit of hegemonic
systems, this radical trait of derision and of violence, this challenge
that the system is summoned to answer through its own death, then I am a
terrorist and nihilist in theory as the others are with their weapons.
Theoretical violence, not truth, is the only recourse left us.
But such a sentiment is utopian. Because it would be beautiful
to be a nihilist, if there were still a radicality--as it would be nice
to be a terrorist, if death, including that of the terrorist, still had
meaning.
Baudrillard gives up on the idea of a radicality in theory, a position of
negativity relative to the system, Adorno's position. But he is at his
negative dialectical best in this passage, which is a statement of
complicity with the utopianism of the terrorist's challenge, as well as a
statement of the utmost pessimism regarding the subject's ability to
effect a change in the system, which in the end neutralizes every event,
no matter how deadly:
The dead are annulled by indifference, that is where terrorism is the
involuntary accomplice of the whole system, not politically, but in the
accelerated form of indifference that it contributes to imposing. Death
no longer has a stage, neither phantasmatic nor political, on which to
represent itself, to play itself out, either a ceremonial or a violent
one. And this is the victory of the other nihilism, of the other
terrorism, that of the system. (Simulacra 163-164)
Did death have a stage on September 11th? Have the dead since been
annulled by indifference, caught up in the media's mode of
disappearance? Despite the terrorists' successful attempt to put death
back on stage in a symbolic exchange with "the system," the majority of
Americans have by now assimilated its violence into the broader narrative
of a war against terrorism and Evil, one of the many things on TV. -
The 9/11 attacks have succeeded, as Baudrillard says, in turning
the U.S. into a vengeful police state and in accelerating its attempts to
dominate the world through military force, and this in turn has likely
accelerated the mood of passive nihilism (with its fascination,
melancholy, and indifference). No one can claim that any sort of
progressive politics were served by the terrorists' actions. Baudrillard
certainly does not. And the terrorists weren't even nihilists, they were
fundamentalists, a far cry from Baudrillard's romantic ideal of the
philosopher-terrorist. In "On Nihilism," Baudrillard, like Adorno in the
end, prefers theory as praxis to actual praxis. He concludes not on a
note of cynicism and melancholy, as Kellner reads him, but on a note of
paradoxical idealism:
There is no more hope for meaning. And without a doubt this is a good
thing: meaning is mortal. But that on which it has imposed its ephemeral
reign, what it hoped to liquidate in order to impose the reign of the
Enlightenment, that is, appearances, they are immortal, invulnerable to
the nihilism of meaning or of non-meaning itself.
This is where seduction begins. (163-164)
Rather than respond with apathy and indifference to the disappearance of
meaning now under way, Baudrillard resurrects the once banished realm of
appearances, the aesthetic, in a move beyond the nihilism of
meaning/nihilism of non-meaning dichotomy. As Kellner writes: "Like
Nietzsche, he wants to derive value from the order of appearances without
appeal to a supernatural world, a hinterwelt or a deep reality"
(120). Kellner, who apparently thinks a more Nietzschean joyfulness, as
opposed to Baudrillard's melancholy, is still preferable at the end of
the twentieth century, nevertheless holds to the metaphysics of morality
against the aestheticism of the French Nietzscheans. For those who no
longer acknowledge a "hinterwelt," however, the idea that we
exist in a world of appearances which are irreducible to true essences
(like Good and Evil), is not so far fetched. One thus takes the
Nietzschean turn, toward the aesthetic, and this, Baudrillard tells us,
"is where seduction begins." His later work on this concept in On
Seduction need not be elaborated here, but we should note that Rex
Butler has shown the concept of seduction in Baudrillard to be an
elaboration on the concept of symbolic exchange (71-118).
"Symbolic exchange," according to Butler,
is not simply the negation of economic value but rather its
limit. It is the thinking of that loss, that relationship to
the other, which at once allows exchange, opens it up, and means that it
is never complete, never able to account for itself. (81-82)
If seduction is what rules the chasm left by a symbolic exchange between
the challenger and the system, what was the direction of the seduction
created by 9/11? Were we seduced? Was Baudrillard? Are we being
seduced by Baudrillard? Having revisited his perspective on terrorism
prior to 9/11--terrorism as the ultimate metaphor, but naïve in its
utopianism---let us consider his perspective après le
spectacle.
9/11: Morning of the Living Dead
The spectacle of terrorism forces upon us the terrorism of the spectacle.
-- Jean Baudrillard ("L'Esprit" 15)
- In "L'Esprit du Terrorisme," Baudrillard maintains that
the U.S. as lone Superpower conjures its own Other; by dominating the
globe it creates global resistance. Baudrillard's opening gambit--"In
the end, it was they who did it but we who wished it"--means to implicate
us all in a symbolic exchange with 9/11:
It goes well beyond the hatred that the desolate and the exploited--those
who ended up on the wrong side of the new world order--feel toward the
dominant global power. This malicious desire resides in the hearts of
even those who have shared in the spoils. The allergy to absolute order,
to absolute power, is universal, and the two towers of the World Trade
Center were, precisely because of their identicality, the perfect
incarnation of this absolute order. ("L'Esprit" 13)
The twin towers, like the twin political parties in the U.S., represent a
balance of power, two forces locked in opposition. But like the
Democrats and the Republicans, both towers are virtually identical, and
their dualistic logic leaves no room for remainders. People rebel,
either secretly or openly, against an airtight system, two towers of
power representing the same people in charge, the illusion of
difference. Finally someone throws a monkey wrench into the works in the
form of four jet airplanes, aimed not only at the symbols of American
power, but at the American mass media, which serve to broadcast the
terror and violence worldwide. By way of our simulation technologies,
the terrorists were able to issue a singular challenge to each American,
and it is in this way that the event is properly symbolic in the
Baudrillardian sense, as a gift demanding return. This is a common motif
in Baudrillard, this moment where simulation society is somehow reversed
or revolutionized by the symbolic. By insisting on our unconfessable
complicity, the assumption that we all have a soft spot for the underdog
and a sore spot for the overdog, especially when the latter is on the
brink of dominating the global playpen, Baudrillard further challenges us
to answer the challenge of 9/11, to enter the debate at the level of a
singular exchange. As individuals, our ability to influence what is done
in the name of the U.S. is limited, but as intellectuals, we must ask
ourselves: what is the symbolic meaning and effect of the event? An
essay exam for the whole nation. The twin towers symbolize corporate
globalization, the Pentagon the American military, and both together
stand for what Baudrillard calls "the system." The numbers 9-1-1 signal
Emergency, and the date marks a number of historical events: the 1989
massacre in Haiti which ousted Aristide; the 1973 overthrow of Allende in
Chile; and the 1683 battle of Vienna, where Islam was ultimately defeated
by Poland, the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire.[5] But for Baudrillard the symbolic meaning
of the event lies not only in its reducibility to such referents, but in
its irreducible, singular, and irrevocable challenge to each and every
imagination. Doubtless most Americans would deny any complicity with the
terrorists on 9/11, but few would deny that it was the most fascinating
day of the century, and this fascination, the product of the system, was
what the terrorists counted on. -
Baudrillard demonstrates in this essay that what the terrorists
carried out is indeed one version--the most literal version--of what he
has meant all along by a symbolic death exchange with the system, thus
implicating his own theories as those which explain, and in this sense
further fortify, the symbolic power of terrorism. His instruction manual
continues:
Never attack the system in terms of the balance of power. The balance of
power is an imaginary (revolutionary) construct imposed by the system
itself, a construct that exists in order to force those who attack it to
fight on the battlefield of reality, the system's own terrain. Instead,
move the struggle into the symbolic sphere, where defiance, reversion,
and one-upmanship are the rule, so that the only way to respond to death
is with an equivalent or even greater death. Defy the system with a gift
to which it cannot reply except with its own death and its own downfall.
. . .
You have to make the enemy lose face. And you'll never achieve
that through brute force, by merely eliminating the Other. (16)
Certainly the terrorists' attack on the battlefield of reality was
devastating on its own, but their attack on the symbolic battlefield,
Baudrillard maintains, was far more devastating in terms of achieving
their global aspirations. According to the system's logic, the Other
loses when they only kill one of your soldiers and you kill all of
theirs, but according to the symbolic logic of the terrorists, the
greater the sacrifice, the greater the symbolic honor. "In dealing all
the cards to itself, the system forced the Other to change the rules of
the game," and under the new rules, the strongest power in the world
violently decimating one of the weakest powers at the cost of a single
life is not honorable, it is only efficient (14). Baudrillard,
scandalous as ever, hands the symbolic victory of the war on terror to
the terrorists, all but crediting them with recent economic, political,
and psychological "recessions" in the West, and with the fact that
"deregulation has ended in maximum security, in a level of restriction
and constraint equivalent to that found in fundamentalist societies"
(18). -
Since they cannot not report and sensationalize the
event, the media are enlisted in a symbolic exchange that only amplifies
the terrorist's power to terrorize: "The media are part of the event,
they're part of the terror," and so "this terrorist violence is not 'real'
at all. It's worse, in a sense: it's symbolic" (18). The "real"
violence here is thus conducted through the technologies of simulation,
which the terrorists have hijacked for their symbolic ends. Baudrillard's
claim that the symbolic violence was worse and hence more "real" than the
real violence of 9/11 is typically provocative, and another letter to
Harper's takes him on on this score. [6] The argument over which violence was worse, however,
is a dead end, for the question of "the spirit of terrorism" is what is at
stake. What the terrorists count on is that
at the level of images and
information, it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacular and
the symbolic, impossible to distinguish between crime and repression. And
it is this uncontrollable outburst of reversibility that is the veritable
victory of terrorism. (18)
-
Here again this motif in Baudrillard, where
simulation society (the society of the spectacle) is somehow reversed by
the symbolic. The reversibility of crime and repression depends upon the
media's being seduced into working for the criminals, and in effecting
this reversal, the terrorists set off a symbolic-atomic bomb. Their
physical violence was aimed at the lives of thousands of American
taxpayers, but their symbolic violence was aimed at the symbols of
corporate globalization, the American military and perhaps all of
Christendom. The agencies of the latter are thus forced into the symbolic
arena, and must choose how to respond, what appearances to deploy.
-
In one of the letters to Harper's, Matthew Kelly writes that
"the attack's symbolic wallop is obvious to a toddler," but it is not
just about recognizing that the twin towers and the Pentagon stand for.
Baudrillard means for us also to recognize the primitive symbolic
challenge, the sacrifice, the gift of their own deaths, which demands our
response if we are to save face. One wonders how many Americans would be
willing to sacrifice their lives as a show of support for what the twin
towers and Pentagon symbolize. Baudrillard's point about primitive
symbolism is that the symbol represents a unique and binding challenge, a
gift that must somehow be returned by everyone it affects. How are we,
if we are the U.S., to respond? Our first priority in formulating a
response should be to pose the question the U.S. news media have deemed
too sensitive to ask, namely: why did they do it? On October 7, 2002,
however, Osama bin Laden issued his statement on a videotaped message:
What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what
we have tasted for scores of years. Our Nation (the Islamic world) has
been tasting this humiliation and degradation for more than 80 years. Its
sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked and no
one hears and no one heeds. Millions of innocent children are being
killed as I speak. They are being killed in Iraq without committing any
sins. . . . To America, I say only a few words to it and its people. I
swear to God, who has elevated the skies without pillars, neither America
nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it
here in Palestine and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of
Muhammad peace be upon him. (Andreas 29)
The challenge represented in the gift is clear: "you will not know peace
until your military leaves us in peace." This implies a direct question:
why is the U.S. military in Arab countries? The answer, of course, is
that the U.S. military is there to protect U.S. economic interests, in
accordance with its long-held notions of manifest destiny. But U.S.
officials do not respond to this implicit question, their response is no
response, which of course is a response in itself in symbolic terms. The
terrorists count on the likelihood that the U.S. will make a move the
world will view as symbolically dishonorable and aesthetically ugly, in
relation to their act of defiance, that the harder it strikes back, the
worse it will look, and the greater the global resistance. The U.S. can
only win on the aesthetico-symbolic plane, where prestation rules, by
staying its hand, for there is no courage or beauty in brute force.[7] -
So does Baudrillard really support terrorism? Do we? Once again
playing the devil's hand, he seduces us to play the avenging angel by
taking a moral stand. But suppose we take the Nietzschean turn, with
Baudrillard, and view the issue in aesthetic terms: can moral goodness
not still succeed in being beautiful if it avoids making metaphysical
claims? When morality is conceived in aesthetic terms, it loses its
guarantee of universality, but not its symbolic force. And yet by
forcing Good on the world, the U.S. only forces Evil to gain strength.
"Terrorism," Baudrillard tells us, "is immoral," but it is a
response to globalization, which is itself immoral. We are therefore
immoral ourselves, so if we hope to understand anything we will need to
get beyond Good and Evil. . . . In the end, Good cannot vanquish Evil
except by declining to be Good, since, in monopolizing global power, it
entails a backfire of proportional violence. (Simulacra 15)
The U.S., if it wishes to be Good, can only win, in symbolic terms, by
refusing to play, by refusing to be Good. Baudrillard certainly does not
proffer war, which he concludes is simply "a continuation of the absence
of politics by other means" (18). What he recommends, without naming it,
is the forgiveness of debt, the redemption of "Evil." -
Compare this, then, to Nietzsche's advice, which might have been
directed at a future world power such as the U.S.:
It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a
consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest
luxury possible to it--letting those who harm it go unpunished.
"What are my parasites to me?:" it might say. "May they live and prosper:
I am strong enough for that!"
The justice which began with, "everything is dischargeable,
everything must be discharged," ends by winking and letting those
incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as does every good
thing on earth, by overcoming itself. This self-overcoming of
justice: one knows the beautiful name it has given
itself--mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the
privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his--beyond the law.
(Genealogy 72-73)
The triumph of justice, according to Nietzsche, is its self-overcoming;
the most moral is the extra-moral, beyond the war of Good and Evil. If
the U.S. had gone with its first name for its new war effort--"Operation
Infinite Justice"--would Americans have become more readily aware of the
ironic fact that their country had in many ways served injustice
in the Middle East for a great many years? Would some have been quicker
to see that "infinite justice" can only amount to infinite forgiveness?
In this passage, Nietzsche taunts America's wealth and dignity, seducing
us with an image of ourselves more befitting our vanity than the image of
a vengeful America. Vengeance, ressentiment, always claims
morality as its cause, but forgiveness does not have to, because it is a
washing away of guilt/debt, because it is a gift. Rather than make
claims, it gives them away, which nevertheless poses a challenge to the
other to counter-give with a symbolic response. This is for Nietzsche,
as for Baudrillard, one would gather, the most beautiful
aesthetic/symbolic gesture, an extra-moral gesture, beyond Good and
Evil. It is also the only means to peace short of the total annihilation
of a virtually invisible enemy. Would a Nietzschean-style forgiveness of
debt not entail gestures like the removal of U.S. military bases from the
Middle East, the nationalization of Arab oil assets, the discontinuation
of all support for dictatorships in the area and around the world, and
the promotion of a Palestinian nation? And if such tokens of
"forgiveness" were offered, does anyone doubt that a more livable peace
would soon be at hand, and that the U.S. would incur its greatest
possible symbolic honor? -
If we assume, with Baudrillard, that there is a rule of
reciprocity between conscious beings, wherein their symbolic standing
vis à vis one another depends on what they give in
exchange, and if we assume that the recognition of this rule of value
runs deeper in humans everywhere than does the recognition of the rule of
value imposed by capitalism, and if we assume that the
terrorists have appealed to this rule before the world, do we choose to
play by the rule, or to ignore it? So far the U.S. has ignored it by
refusing to answer the implicit questions: Why do they hate us? Why is
our military there? By what right do we exploit their resources,
overthrow their elected leaders, and drop bombs on their people? But no
response is still a response, symbolically speaking, and the world is
listening. What the system did in response to 9/11, or instead of
responding to it, was to re-absorb its symbolic violence back into the
never ending flow of anesthetized simulation, i.e., it has attempted "to
replace a truly formidable event, unique and unforseen, with a
pseudo-event that is as repetitive as it is familiar"
(Harper's 18). This is exactly what Baudrillard predicted
would happen in "On Nihilism," this neutralizing of the terrorist event
by the system. In "L'Esprit," he notes that:
In the terrorist attack the event eclipsed all of our interpretive
models, whereas in this mindlessly military and technological war we see
the opposite: the interpretive model eclipsing the event. (18)
Baudrillard would have us recognize that the attack on 9/11 succeeded in
poking a hole in the U.S.'s mighty shield, thus opening a space "where
seduction begins," and in provoking a murderous response. The terrorists therefore
succeeded (are succeeding) in making the U.S. look bad on the symbolic
battlefield, and in pushing the system further toward its limit and its
implosion, a goal Baudrillard expressly favors. It seems most reasonable
to conclude, however, that such violent, physical provocations serve no
one, not even Baudrillard, and need not be equated with the kind of
theoretical terrorism and aesthetic violence advocated by him (though one
can always accuse him of being the first to blur the lines between the
real and the imaginary). Given his cynicism about the system's ability
to neutralize every opposition, however, Baudrillard sees such dramatic
gestures (as 9/11) as naïve in their utopianism. And yet he too has
his utopianism, which can be found in the silent evocation of the only
decent, beautiful solution to the challenge of 9/11. Unlike naïve
terrorists and secondary critics, however, Baudrillard will not speak his
utopia,[8] which in this case is the
possibility of forgiveness as a world-historical symbolic event. This
utopian moment in Baudrillard, this idea that the U.S. might forgive its
debtors, is obviously unrealistic as yet, but every challenge opens up a
new space in the universe. This is where seduction begins. -
As for death, it is still un-American. We live mostly, as Ernest
Becker claimed, in denial of death, which our marketing specialists have
yet to fully package. We live in ignorance of the death and misery
caused by our military and its industry. No one knows how many lives, or
anything about the individuals killed. We see only TV spectacles. We do
not see the real, or know the real, but we are a culture fascinated by
its simulacrum. Approximately 3,000 more people joined the ranks of the
dead on 9/11 and for most of us they were only abstractions, but the
fascination we felt, the release, is something everyone is now
anticipating, every false alarm a tease. Whether we see it in
Baudrillardian or Freudian terms, this is the death drive. The most
recent Gallup poll shows 53% of Americans in favor of the U.S. invading
Iraq alone. Toward the end of Symbolic Exchange and Death,
Baudrillard states what he believes is on all of our minds:
Death itself demands to be experienced immediately, in total blindness
and total ambivalence. But is it revolutionary? If political economy is
the most rigorous attempt to put an end to death, it is clear that only
death can put an end to political economy. (86-87)
- Forget waiting for it, let's have another spectacle; let's demand
death now! Is Baudrillard being sinister when he tempts us with our
desire for more death? Is he death's seducer? Not if we allow for his
caveat about the term "death" found in the book's second footnote: "death
ought never to be understood as the real event that affects a subject or
a body, but as a form in which the determinacy of the subject
and of value is lost" (5, n. 2). Baudrillard uses the term death to
signify "the real event" throughout Symbolic Exchange and
Death, and only sometimes uses it as a conceptual figure like
this, but if he is not talking here about real death, where some
subject and some value are certainly lost, what is he talking about?
Death, in Baudrillard's specialized sense, signifies the end of "bound
energies in stable oppositions," but since the system itself is also
capable of imposing such deaths, he clarifies that the death of the
system can only be achieved by way of its strategic reversal:
For the system is master: like God it can bind or unbind energies; what
it is incapable of (and what it can no longer avoid) is reversibility.
Reversibility alone therefore, rather than unbinding or drifting, is
fatal to it. This is exactly what the term symbolic "exchange" means.
Baudrillard contends that the system cannot reverse itself, but that one
might cause it to enact "death" as the form of an exchange in which its
values no longer apply, in which its determinations become
indeterminate. One does this by giving it a gift it cannot respond to
without killing itself in this way, without undermining its own
authority. This can be done effectively with words and/or pictures:
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Figure 1: The Selling of Joy[9]
© Thomas Antel Used
with permission of photographer
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but it can also be done with jet airplanes:
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Figure 2
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53% of our baser instincts may demand that real death, the "real event
that affects a subject or a body" (whether in Baghdad or Manhattan) be
experienced now, but Baudrillard does not. Baudrillard is far more
nihilistic than most terrorists and warmongers. The capitalist system,
he says, will sooner or later reclaim all such "freed energies." Whether or not
we share his pessimism, his conception of the symbolic affords us a view
of human relations that is based on recognition and reciprocity, instead
of ignorance and domination, which is about what America needs right
now. As for his remarks on terrorism and death, however, let us hope
Baudrillard does not suffer Nietzsche's fate and wind up the misread
philosopher of murderous thugs.
Department of English
University of Wisconsin, La Crosse
butterfi.brad@uwlax.edu
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Notes
1. From "L'Esprit du Terrorisme" (13, 14,
18).
2. See Symbolic
Exchange and Death (5, n. 2), which I discuss in the final section
of this essay.
3. It is likely that Baudrillard's
theory of the primitive and his whole theory of the symbolic (as gift)
derive more from a history of colonial projection than from the truth
about the colonized. In The Potlatch Papers: A Colonial Case
History, Christopher Bracken argues that the potlatch in
twentieth-century European anthropology and philosophy is the invention
of a nineteenth-century Canadian law meant to outlaw it. Bracken does
not mention Baudrillard, but Lyotard does along these same lines: "How is
it that he does not see that the whole problematic of the gift, of
symbolic exchange, such as he receives it from Mauss...belongs in its
entirety to Western racism and imperialism--that it is still ethnology's
good savage, slightly libidinalized, which he inherits with the concept?"
(106).
No longer believing in true origins, however, Baudrillard would like to
be free of the distinction between the real and the imaginary savage so
as to focus on the concept of symbolic exchange, a concept containing a
compelling, if understated, ethic: that one must respond, and is
responsible, to the other; that one's honor depends on what one gives;
and that the value of the gift is not quantifiable but is symbolic. One
will get nowhere trying to verify his speculations about the "real
primitives," and I could not speak for indigenous people as to whether
they should value his "gift" to them as a compliment or an insult. See
Piper for discussion of Baudrillard's place in the new primitivist
counter-culture, "the drop-out culture of the sixties redefined as both
indigenous and postmodern" (177).
4. See for instance "Homer's Contest"
(Portable 32-39).
5. See Stille and Alden.
6. Matthew Kelly of Brooklyn writes "I
choked on the quotation marks buffeting the word 'real' . . . which, in
his view, the September 11 violence was not" (86).
7. As I write, President Bush has
declared a new, "preventive" unilateralism in
U.S. military policy, and the Senate has authorized the President to proceed
with an invasion of Iraq at his own discretion, regardless of international
opinion. This current push toward global domination by force must strike
all but the most authoritarian Americans as deeply ignoble. After all, it
flies in the face of our TV and Hollywood upbringing, which teaches us that
it's only bad guys who want to rule the world and that nobody should end up
as "lord of the rings." Indeed, the contradiction between image and reality
is becoming so apparent that, in keeping with the Orwellian nature of the
Bush administration, we might almost expect revisionist remakes to start
replacing the standard Hollywood movies. We'll find that Austin Powers and
Dr. Evil have somehow changed roles, and that we're cheering for good guys
who rule the world with an iron hand while egalitarian villains plot against
them.
8.
In The Illusion of the
End,
Baudrillard cites Adorno to this effect: "Every ecstasy ultimately
prefers to take the path of renunciation rather than sin against its own
concept by realizing itself" (104).
9. There's a powerful narrative implied
in this photo; an annoyed resident of the so-called "third world" holds a
box of Joy for the camera, and suddenly we don't feel so happy about
Joy. When we are made conscious of the implicit, metaphysical insult of
a class-based global village, we are made aware of the symbolic standing
between the first world and the third. The anti-commercial is a symbolic
challenge to the real commercial, posing one image against another,
demanding a response. Baudrillardian symbolic exchange is based on this
principle of reversal and seduction, and so has much in common with Guy
Debord's and the Situationists' concept of "detournement" and
with what Kalle Lasn and Adbusters call "culture jamming"
(see Lasn 103-109).
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