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Evolution and Contingency
Arkady Plotnitsky
Purdue University
aplotnit@sla.purdue.edu
(c) 2004 Arkady Plotnitsky.
All rights reserved.
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Review of:
Gould, Stephen J. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2002.
1. We often complain about long books, and, at nearly 1500
pages, Stephen Jay Gould's magnum opus is about as long as
one could find in the sciences. But then, the actual genre
of the book, which is a mixture of science, history of
science, and biography, sets it apart from most science
books as well, although the approach has its companions and
precursors from Galileo's dialogues (which add literature to
the mix) on. We do not, however, always do long books
justice either; and I'd urge the readers of this review to
give Gould the benefit of the doubt and read the whole book,
which, it may be added, is not forbidding in its technical
aspects. One could of course benefit considerably even from
readings parts of it. Gould must have known that some would,
and he offers a summary of the chapters' content at the
outset, which can be used to plot various itineraries
through the book. Chapter 1, "Defining and Revising the
Structure of Evolutionary Theory," is almost a book in
itself, especially by current publishing standards (The
Structure of Evolutionary Theory [hereafter SET] 1-89).
Chapter 2, "The Essence of Darwinism and the Basis of Modern
Orthodoxy," offers an introduction to Darwin in general and
in a twentieth-century context, and is reasonably
self-contained, as well. Gould, however, pleads with his
readers to "read the book," the whole book (SET 89). No
doubt the book could be trimmed, but, in this reader's
assessment, not by much (maybe by 150 pages or so), and, in
some respects, it may not be long enough. But then perhaps
no book, no matter how long, could be in a case like this.
2. The Tolstoyan, War-and-Peace scale and ambition of the
project are not out of place. The book may even be seen as
the "War and Peace" of evolution itself (the relative
"peace" or more gradual processes of adaptational natural
selection punctuated by war-like catastrophes wiping out
entire species) and of the history of evolutionary theory,
or even of Gould's own life as a scientist. Evolutionary
peace is of course relative at best, a fact reflected in
Darwin's extraordinary (full) title, On the Origin of
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation
of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. But then so is
Tolstoy's peace, as familial and societal "wars" are waged
in the continuous struggle for social survival and success.
Possibly influenced by Darwin's work, Tolstoy's concept of
history in War and Peace (which contains, as one its two
epilogues, a philosophical essay on the nature of history)
is itself relevant to Gould's argument and is invoked by him
(SET 1340).
3. Gould, rightly, sees Darwin's historicizing of evolution and
his conception of history as among his most important
contributions, perhaps, combined, the most important one. He
also, again, rightly, sees Darwin as a /philosophical/
(rather than only scientific) revolutionary, an aspect of
Darwin's work he addresses at some length (99-103, 117-63).
(That Gould himself shares this ambition is evident in the
book as well.) That history and, hence, at least some
philosophy of history are significant is inevitable, given
evolution as the subject of their scientific pursuits,
inevitable, that is, once Darwin gives life evolution and
thus history. In this case, however, at stake is also the
introduction of a new /philosophical concept/ of history, as
part of a scientific theory, which is not inevitable, since
one can also borrow such a concept from elsewhere.
Revolutionary as Darwin is, along with so many others, on
this score, he is not without his debts. In particular,
Darwin's concepts of history may be seen as extending
Hegel's. Hegel is, to be sure, only one among Darwin's
precursors, but a more significant one than we might surmise
from Gould's discussion of Darwin's historical thinking,
where Hegel is strangely absent. (Gould does invoke Hegel's
notion of dialectical synthesis [591].) Nietzsche, in
singling out Hegel's unique contribution as a philosopher of
history, made the point in strong terms by stating that
"without Hegel there could have been no Darwin" (Gay Science
305). This may or may not be true, but, to use Nietzsche's
term, the "genealogy" itself is hardly in question. The
general appeal to history is more natural (in either sense)
in evolutionary theory than in philosophy. As, however, a
/structural/ element of theorizing a given phenomenon (which
is also how history works in Darwin, and in Gould), it was
largely introduced by Hegel and is arguably his greatest
philosophical discovery. It is also worth noting the equally
crucial influence of Adam Smith on both Hegel and (in part
via Thomas Malthus and against William Paley) Darwin, which
Gould stresses in Darwin's case (59-60, 121-125, 231-32).
Both Hegel's philosophy and Darwin's theory are,
conceptually, forms of economics, theories of gains and
losses in the struggle of concepts or living beings for life.
4. Gould's own concept of history also follows that of
Nietzsche (52, 1214-18). As Gould notes:
Although I am chagrined that I discovered Nietzsche's
account [in On the Genealogy of Morals] of the
distinction between current utility and historical
origin so late in my work, I know no better
introduction--from one of history's greatest
philosophers to boot, and in his analysis of morality,
not of any scientific subject--to the theoretical
importance of spandrels and exaptation in the
rebalancing of constraint and adaptation within
evolutionary theory (Chapter 11, pp. 1214-1218). (52)[1
<#foot1>]
Gould also stresses that Darwin's theory, especially his
nearly unconditional insistence on the organismal character
of selection, was deeply indebted to the analogy with
theories of morality, specifically, again, Adam Smith's work
(127-36; 596-97). On the other hand, Darwinism is one of
Nietzsche's points of departure for his analysis in On the
Genealogy of Morals, a point missed or not addressed by
Gould (21). Gould does note similarities with Darwin in
Nietzsche's argument, which he sees as "almost eerie," but
which are, I would argue, inevitable (1217). It would be
surprising otherwise, even though Nietzsche famously
preferred Lamarck to Darwin, or a certain "Lamarck" to a
certain "Darwin." Gould's Darwin would be much closer to
Nietzsche, and Gould, it is worth noting, gives a
well-deserved credit to Lamarck as well (170-92). Had Gould
dug into Nietzsche a bit deeper, he could have discovered
the conceptual problematic of evolutionary theory there. In
any event, Nietzsche takes our understanding of the history
of morality in radically new directions, including those
that Gould found converging on his concept of evolutionary
history.
5. This concept also serves Gould's critique of Darwin's
grounding of evolution in organismal selection, a critique
in part extracted from Darwin's argument against its grain,
from Darwin's "battle with himself," or, one might say, by
means of a deconstruction from within Darwin's argument
(135-36, 596-97). A central part of Gould's program is "the
expansion of Darwin's reliance upon organismal selection
into a hierarchical model of simultaneous selection at
several levels of Darwinian individuality (gene, cell
lineage, organism, deme, species and clade)" (1340).
Darwin's version of Nietzsche's principle of the distinction
between current utility and historical origin is "overly
restrictive" and "remains fully adaptational," as against
Gould's, which extends this principle to the role of
different structural elements, such as spandrel and
exaptation, in shaping evolution (1229). Applications and
implications of this principle extend far beyond this
particular case, however, and lead to a radical view of
evolution--one of the book's most important philosophical,
as well as scientific, contributions.
6. There are many other contributions, some equally important,
and reflecting equally radical and controversial views. The
book is a scientific, philosophical, and cultural document
of major significance; the parallels with Galileo, Tolstoy,
and Hegel are not fortuitous, and the one with Darwin is
unavoidable, given that Gould clearly aims at Darwin's reach
and scale. It is not accidental, either, that one can invoke
scientific, philosophical, and literary works here, even
apart from the role literature and art play in Gould's
argument and exposition. At the same time, the links to the
ideas of such authors as Nietzsche, whom Gould, again,
follows expressly, or (Gould might have been surprised to
hear this) Derrida and Deleuze, and Gould's inescapable
presence in the current cultural debates also make the book
a significant document of postmodern thought and culture.
This significance is further amplified by the shift from
physics to life sciences and information sciences, and their
relationships (for example, in the genome project) as
primarily defining the relationships between science and
culture during the same postmodernist period. Physics
retains its scientific and cultural role, in part in
conjunction with information sciences, as in quantum
information theory, and new biology, specifically via chaos
and complexity theory (an icon, sometimes abused, of many
recent discussions in the humanities as well). Even though
not given a major treatment, complexity theory and its
application in evolutionary theory, especially in Stuart
Kauffman's work, play an important role in Gould's argument
for extending and radicalizing Darwin (SET 1208-14).
7. This argument is for the extension of evolutionary theory
beyond what Gould calls the modern synthesis of (the more
traditional) Darwinism, presented in Part I, "The History of
Darwinian Logic Debate," toward a different type of
evolutionary theory presented in Gould's argument in Part
II, "Toward a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory." The
key aspects of both logics are explained from the outset,
where Gould uses the memorable image of Agostino Scilla's
corals as a symbol of Darwin's theory, to be reshaped by
Gould's revisions, even against Darwin's favorite "tree of
life," although, as will be seen, both share their essential
tree-like structure (16-19, 97). Darwin's first book was on
corals, and it is honored by Gould with "the coral reef
principle" of sequencing of Darwin's historical way of
thinking (103-4). This joint structure--of Darwin's theory
and Gould's revision--is reiterated throughout the book. It
is even restated, with a considerable mastery of
composition, in the final and the longest footnote in the
book on page 1313 and then yet again in (almost) closing the
book. To cite this final summary:
In most general terms, and in order to form a more
perfect union among evolution's hierarchy of structural
levels and tiers of time, this revised theory rests upon
an expansion and substantial reformation of all three
central principles that build the tripod of support for
Darwinian logic: (1) the expansion of Darwin's reliance
upon organismal selection into a hierarchical model of
simultaneous selection at several levels of Darwinian
individuality (gene, cell lineage, organism, deme,
species and clade); (2) the construction of an
interactive model to explain the sources of creative
evolutionary change by fusing the positive constraints
of structural and historical pathways internal to the
anatomy and development of organisms (the functionalist
approach); and (3) the generation of theories
appropriate to the characteristic rates and modalities
of time's higher tiers to explain the extensive range of
macroevolutionary phenomena (particularly the
restructuring of global biotas in episodes of mass
extinction) that cannot be rendered as simple
extrapolated consequences of microevolutionary
principles. (1340)
8. This is an immense program, and one can, obviously, offer no
more than a sketch of some among its lineaments here. I
shall assess Gould's argument from a particular angle,
indicated by my title, "evolution and contingency," which
will, however, allow me to address some among the most
fundamental aspects of the argument. Many other aspects of
it, some of them important, will have to be sacrificed. Most
of these, however, are among the better known and the more
extensively commented-upon aspects of Darwin's work or
post-Darwinian evolutionary theory and of Gould's work.
Given this history, Gould's theoretical and historical
arguments in the book are bound to be challenged by
evolutionary theorists and historians of science. Here,
however, in a more "positive spirit," such as Nietzsche
invokes in On the Genealogy of Morals, I will look beyond
these specific points of agreement or disagreement to
consider some of the more radical questions and challenges
posed by the book itself (18).
9. My angle is defined by the joint /role/ of chance and
discontinuity (as in Gould's "punctuation") in evolution and
in the structure (or history) of evolutionary theory and,
indeed inevitably, beyond them. The scientific and
epistemological significance of this problematic in
evolutionary theory and elsewhere in modern science is
unquestionable.[2 <#foot2>] It is, I would argue, culturally
significant as well. At least from the mid-nineteenth
century on, our culture may be seen as the culture of
chance, or of the confrontation with chance, a confrontation
which, in the absence of any counterbalancing causality, it
may not yet be ready to accept (SET 1332-33). I speak of the
/role/ of chance (rather than simply chance), since the
argument of the book is not primarily about chance but is
(more) about causality and organization (46-47, 1339). And
yet, from Darwin on, chance is seen as an essential force in
evolution, which gives the concept of chance a central role
in the structure of evolutionary theory, especially as it is
developed in Gould's work, including in this book. I shall
link causality and chance in the concept of /contingency/
(which is also Gould's preferred concept) as the
/(inter)play/ of both. The idea originates with Democritus
and extends through a long chain of thinkers to Derrida in
particular, and is here invoked by Gould via the complexity
theorists Jacques Monod and Stuart Kauffman (144, 1336).[3
<#foot3>] My appeal to contingency stresses the significance
of theorizing chance in evolution, as opposed to causal
explanation, while keeping the latter as part of the overall
theory. This emphasis is consistent with both Darwin's and
Gould's views, different as these are in their overall
theoretical structure. Gould's own use of contingency is
defined at the outset, in his biographical "Apologia Pro
Vita Sua," complementing his historicist philosophy and
attitude, his "love of history in the broadest sense." He
writes:
Finally, my general love of history in the broadest
sense spilled over into my empirical work as I began to
explore the role of history's great theoretical theme in
my empirical work as well--/contingency, or the tendency
of complex systems with substantial stochastic
components, and intricate nonlinear interactions among
components, to be unpredictable in principle from full
knowledge of antecedent conditions, but fully
explainable after time's actual unfoldings/. (46;
emphasis added)
10. This concept of contingency is close, but not identical, to
that of chaos and complexity theories (specifically as
developed in Kauffman's work), as the invocation of the
terms "complex systems" and "nonlinearity" suggests. While
granting the significance of the Gouldian dynamics of
contingency in evolution, I shall introduce a broader and in
some respects more radical view of chance (conceived in part
on the model of quantum theory) and, hence, of contingency,
and suggest that this type of chance plays a role in
evolutionary theory. Overall, I shall argue that it is the
/structure/ of evolutionary /contingency/--of what types of
chance, of causality, and of the relationships between
them--that is, ultimately, at stake in Gould's argument.
Gould's book directs us /toward/ a different, higher-level,
synthesis between the modern (Darwinist) synthesis presented
in Part I and Gould's argument presented in Part II, "Toward
a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory." This new
synthesis, for which, as Gould says, the Hegelian triad of
thesis-antithesis-synthesis may be inadequate, is not
offered in the book, which only directs us "toward" it
(591). The book does not have and did not aim to have a Part
III, but it did aim to argue for such a new synthesis and to
prepare for it--a Herculean labor and an immense achievement
already (SET 591-92; also pp. 46-47, 1332-43). It is clear,
however, that, as announced by Gould at the outset,
following his definition of contingency, and as sketched in
the epilogue, that new synthesis is fundamentally defined by
the role of contingency in the structure of evolutionary
theory. As Gould writes:
This work [his previous work on contingency] led to two
books on the pageant of life's history [Wonderful Life:
The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History [1989] and
Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to
Darwin [1996]). Although this book, by contrast, treats
general theory and its broad results (patterns vs.
pageant in terms of this text), rather than contingency
and the explanation of life's particulars, the science
of contingency must ultimately be integrated with the
more conventional science of general theory as explored
in this book--for we shall thus attain our best possible
understanding of both pattern and pageant, and their
different attributes and predictabilities. The closing
sections of the book (pp. 1332-1343 of Chapter 12) offer
some suggestions for these future efforts. (46-47)
11. I shall have a chance to return to the image of pageant, a
special favorite with Gould, used three times here. The
problematic itself developed in these closing sections may,
as I said, take us toward notions of chance and contingency
more radical than Gould's, but not more than what may be
demanded from our theories by evolution--or by life, to
which both Darwin and Gould appeal at crucial junctures. The
concept of evolution may be insufficient in turn, even as it
emerges in all its architectural complexity in Darwin's or
Gould's cathedral, a persistent image in the book, almost
closing it as well--almost: ultimately Darwin's "the tree of
life" does. Gould's argument is, however, framed by Milan's
Duomo and San Marco in Venice, with the architecture of New
York taking over in the Epilog (SET 1-6, 1249-55, 1339).
Would life, however we image it, be sufficient? Do we, in
truth, have such a concept qua concept, life, which doubt
compelled Shelley to ask in his great unfinished poem The
Triumph of Life, the poem that his death interrupted,
punctuated, on this very question: "What is Life?"? Would
even a double question mark be enough?
12. Gould's book was published posthumously in 2002 (Gould died
earlier the same year). Forty years earlier, in closing his
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn
addressed Darwin's evolutionary theory, a primary
inspiration for Kuhn's own work. Kuhn noted that Darwin's
most innovative and radical idea, which "bothered many
professionals most was neither the notion of species change
nor the possible descent of man from apes," but instead that
of the abolition of evolutionary teleology (171-72). These,
especially, as Gould stresses, the first one, remain
important conceptually, historically, and culturally (SET
99-103). Nevertheless, Kuhn is right. As he elaborates:
The evidence pointing to evolution, including the
evolution of man, had been accumulating for decades, and
the idea of evolution had been suggested and widely
disseminated before. Though evolution, as such, did
encounter resistance, particularly from some religious
groups, it was by no means the greatest of the
difficulties the Darwinians faced. That difficulty
stemmed from the idea [of non-teleological, undirected
evolution] that was more nearly Darwin's own. All the
well-known pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories--those of
Lamarck, Chambers, Spencer, and the German
/Naturephilosophen/--had taken evolution to be a
goal-directed process. The "idea" of man and of the
contemporary flora and fauna was thought to have been
present from the first creation of life, perhaps in the
mind of God. That idea or plan had provided the
direction and the guiding force to the entire
evolutionary process. Each new stage of evolutionary
development was a more perfect realization of a plan
that has been present from the start. (171-72)
13. Gould's book shows the enormous richness and complexity of
this history and its transition to Darwinism, well beyond
what Kuhn could convey here and, he argues, beyond what
Kuhn's conception of history of science could offer (SET
967-70). Darwin enters the stage set by this history with
"his most significant and least palatable suggestion":
For many men the abolition of that teleological kind of
evolution was the most significant and least palatable
of Darwin's suggestions. The Origin of Species
recognized no goal set either by God or nature. Instead,
natural selection, operating in the given environment
and with the actual organisms presently at hand, was
responsible for the gradual but steady emergence of more
elaborate, further articulated, and vastly more
specialized organisms. Even such marvelously adapted
organs as the eye and hand of man--organs whose design
had previously provided powerful arguments for the
existence of a supreme artificer and an advance
plan--were products of a process that moved steadily
/from/ primitive beginnings but /towards/ no goal. The
belief that natural selection, resulting from mere
competition between organisms for survival, could have
produced man together with the higher animals and plants
was the most difficult and disturbing aspect of Darwin's
theory. What could "evolution," "development," and
"progress" mean in the absence of specified goal? To
many people, such terms suddenly seemed
self-contradictory. (Kuhn 172)
14. Several key Darwinian concepts are indicated here, even
beyond the abolition of evolutionary teleology, most
especially "gradualism" or a more general principle of
"gaining the knowledge of the world" or natural history from
the behavior of its small or even infinitesimal parts or
changes and their continuity.[4 <#foot4>] This principle may
be seen as defining the scientific paradigm and paradigm
change, established not only by Darwin's work but by such
contemporary theories as James Clerk Maxwell's field theory
of electromagnetism and Bernhard Riemann's mathematics (or
earlier differential calculus, since, like all paradigm
changes, this one has a long pre-history as well), and
extending to Einstein's work in relativity. Leibniz, a
co-inventor of differential calculus and a major influence
on Riemann, was arguably the most significant precursor, as
Gould notes, rightly coupling him with Linnaeus--although,
as Gould explains, Charles Lyell may be an equally important
influence upon Darwin in this respect (150, 149, 479-86). In
science, one needed quantum theory to announce a new
paradigm, although there are earlier intimations, especially
as concerns the idea of chance, as in thermodynamics, and
philosophically one can trace this history still earlier.
The principle cannot be sustained in Gould's version of
evolutionary theory either, which shift has its history in
turn, at least from Georges Cuvier on (484-92).
15. Along with most Darwinian concepts, those just mentioned are
given a powerful critical treatment by Gould throughout the
book, using the term "critical" in Kant's sense of critique
as an exploration of fundamental concepts in a given field
and of the conditions for their effective deployment there.
Decisive to this critique are the questions of chance and
discontinuity, and the relationships between them, in
evolution and specifically in the non-teleological view of
evolution advanced by Darwin. Both Kuhn and Gould
fundamentally link the structures of biological and
scientific evolutions, or revolutions, to chance and
discontinuity ("revolution" in Kuhn and "punctuation" in
Gould), in Kuhn's case under the impact of quantum theory.
Gould could hardly have been unaware of the parallel between
Kuhn's and his own title, even if he did not intend a direct
allusion. Nor could he have been unaware of Kuhn's
elaborations just cited, and it is of some interest that he
does not comment on them or Darwin's influence on Kuhn's
work. Gould does discuss Kuhn's ideas concerning scientific
revolution and acknowledges Kuhn's significance and
influence in this respect, as well as noting certain
Darwinian elements in Kuhn's later (1969) "Postscript" to
his book in the context of the concept and the very term
"punctuation" (SET 967-70).
16. Now, all teleology is, by definition, causal, even if, as I
shall explain, this causality is hidden behind (the
appearance of) chance, and, by virtue of its causal nature,
essentially continuous. Accordingly, the questions of chance
and discontinuity, or of the relationships between causality
and chance and continuity and discontinuity (or among all of
these), may be seen as less interesting in this case. On the
other hand, the role of chance and discontinuity in
non-teleological views of evolution is a subtle issue, which
caused a complex and sometimes ambivalent attitude on the
part of Darwin himself, specifically in the relations
between more local (such as adaptation) and more global
evolutionary dynamics (SET 1333-36). Can we dispense with
chance and discontinuity, given the abolition of teleology?
What are the dynamics of chance or discontinuity? How are
the latter linked to causalities and continuities? What are
the relationships between chance and discontinuity, or
causality and continuity? These are decisive questions. For,
at least in evolution, chance without causality, or
discontinuity without continuity, would be almost as
problematic and scientifically uninteresting as causality,
natural or divine, absolutely without chance (100-2). In
question is an interplay of chance and causality or
necessity, of which Democritus was perhaps first to speak,
coupled, if one wants to trace it to the pre-Socratics, to
the Heraclitean becoming, the never-the-same flow of
evolution, but, on this view, the flow interrupted and
reshaped by discontinuity. With Darwin and, then, with
Nietzsche, this double interplay acquires an extraordinary
and ultimately irreducible complexity and, as Derrida
argues, becomes /ultimately/ incalculable, preventing us
from ascertaining whether, at least, some events are
products of chance or causal dynamics (7).[5 <#foot5>]
17. Gould's own contribution to evolutionary theory belongs
primarily to this problematic of causality and chance,
within contingency, or (sometimes correlatively) between
punctuation and continuity. It is, again, important that all
these elements and various relationships between and among
them are engaged with by Gould and made parts of the
structure of evolutionary theory, as he sees it. Thus, for
example, the continuity and persistence of form
(morphological continuity) or that of other constraints is
just as important as punctuation, as both equally work
against orthodox Darwinism. This type of complexity is
found, however, throughout Gould's arguments, for and
against Darwin's theory, and translates into the
relationships, conceptual or historical, between various
strains of evolutionary theory. Granting this complexity,
one might, nevertheless, argue that the most radical
implication, if not the idea, of Darwin's theory is that of
the role of chance, also in its discontinuous, interruptive
effect, as the primary force of evolutionary change. As
Gould says:
If, however, as the central thesis of this book
maintains and the [postmodern?] /Zeitgeist/ of our
dawning millennium no longer rejects [in contrast to
evolutionists and paleontologists of the preceding
generations], we cannot validate the actuality of
mammalian success by general principles, but only as a
happy (albeit entirely sensible) /contingency/ of a
historical process with innumerable alternatives that
didn't happen to attain expression (despite their equal
plausibility before the fact), then we must face the
philosophical question of whether we have surrendered
too much [of contingency] in developing a more complex
and nuanced view of /causality/ in the history of life.
(SET 1332; emphasis added)
18. On this view, the rise of humans, as conscious animals, is,
too, a product of contingency, of a series of contingent, if
sensible accidents, perhaps glorious, as Gould once called
them, but accidents nonetheless. The question becomes what
is the particular character of this chance and, hence, of
the interplay of chance and causality defining the
contingency/ies of evolution. The emphasis on contingency,
as the interplay of chance and causality, rather than on
chance alone, is crucial, but the character of contingency
is defined by the character of chance within it. This is not
to say that the nature of causalities and necessities
involved in evolution is not important; quite the contrary,
and we need as rich and complex conceptions and theories of
causal processes as we can develop. The same argument
applies to continuity and discontinuity, and the
relationships between them, or between them and causality
and chance. Gould's elaboration opening the section
"Undirected," dealing with Darwin's abolition of teleology,
indicates this complexity as well, in part by way of warning
(143-46). Gould stresses the contingent and yet also notes
the crucial significance of chance in shaping this
complexity, including as concerns "/the direction of
evolutionary change/." He writes:
Textbooks of evolution still often refer to variations
as "random." We all recognize this designation as a
misnomer, but continue to use the phrase by force of
habit. Darwinians have never argued for "random"
mutation in the restricted and technical sense of
"equally likely in all directions," as in tossing a die.
But our sloppy use of "random" [...] does capture, at
least in a vernacular sense, the essence of the
important claim that we do wish to convey--namely, that
variation must be /unrelated to the direction of
evolutionary change/; or, more strongly, that nothing
about the process of creating raw material biases the
pathway of subsequent change in adaptive directions.
This fundamental postulate gives Darwinism its "two
step" character, the "chance" and "necessity" of Monod's
famous formulation--the separation of a source of raw
material (mutation, recombination, etc.) from a force of
change (natural selection). (144)
19. Monod's formulation captures well the Darwinian contingency,
to which Gould adds the chance of punctuation, or,
conversely, additional morphological causalities and/as
continuities, thus reshaping the overall structure of
evolutionary contingency. As will be seen, there may be more
of tossing of the dice in mutation. The problem, however,
may indeed be that the complexity of the process prevents us
from properly assessing how much, if at all, loaded these
dice are. In any event, the mutations in question are random
enough, at least as "/unrelated to the direction of
evolutionary change/," as Gould rightly stresses. That is,
they are random enough to change our view of evolution. The
evolutionary survival of such mutations is of course a still
different bet, more Darwinian (gradualist and adaptational)
or more Gouldian, which supplements the Darwinian bet with
other elements, such as the contingency of punctuation. Even
well-adapted species, such as dinosaurs, or potentially
well-adaptable species in the proper evolutionary contexts
of their emergence and developments, could be "punctuated"
out of existence due to external (geological or cosmic
events) or other changes in the context.
20. It is true that, as I have indicated, this particular book
is, at least overtly, not about contingency. Gould stresses
this point in the Epilog:
But this book--entitled The Structure of Evolutionary
Theory--does not address the realm of contingency as a
central subject, and fires my very best shot in the
service of my lifelong fascination for the fierce beauty
and sheer intellectual satisfaction of timeless and
general theory. I am a child of the streets of New York;
and although I reveled in a million details of molding
on the spandrel panels of Manhattan skyscrapers, and
while I marveled at the inch of difference between a
forgotten foul ball and an immortal home run, I guess I
always thrilled more to the power of coordination than
to the delight of a strange moment--or I would not have
devoted 20 years and the longest project of my life to
macroevolutionary theory rather than paleontological
pageant. (1339)
21. And yet, even as the book only looks toward and prepares the
ground for the synthesis of the science of general theory
and the science of contingency in evolutionary theory, while
primarily doing general theory, contingency is everywhere in
this book. This is hardly surprising. Indeed, there is a
"because" behind my "and yet." Contingency is irreducibly
complicit with the general theory engaged with by the book,
or in Darwin's work and most versions of Darwinism, which,
accordingly, defines the character of the future theory that
Gould has in mind. To give one example, which is, however,
central to Gould's argument, Nietzsche's principle,
mentioned earlier, of "the distinction between current
utility and historical origin" shapes (albeit differently)
both Darwin's and Gould's arguments. "Nietzsche recognizes
(as Darwin did)," that this principle also
establishes grounds for contingency and unpredictability
in history--for if any organ [such as the eye or hand],
during its history, undergoes a series of quirky shifts
in function, then we can neither predict the next use
from a current value, nor can we easily work backwards
to elucidate the reason behind the origin of the trait.
(1217)
Hence, the irreducible role of contingency and indeed chance
("unpredictability") in the general theory, Darwin's and
even more so Gould's. There could be no Darwin without
contingency anymore than without history, as Darwin's
concept of history is itself crucially shaped by the concept
of contingency as the interplay of chance and causality
(without ultimate causes) in evolution.
22. Gould "embraces this /apparent/ paradox with delight": "I
have championed contingency, and will continue to do so,
because its large realm and legitimate claims have been so
poorly attended by evolutionary scientists who cannot
discern the beat of this different drummer while their
brains and ears remain tuned to the sounds of general
theory" (1339; emphasis added). The paradox itself is of
course only apparent, or reveals a more subtle theoretical
logic. One might also say that the paradox interrupts and
destabilizes the accepted logic of evolutionary theory, and
leads to a new logic and, with it, new evolutionary theory,
which thus "refute" the paradox, along with (some) of the
Darwinisms and even (some) Darwin. As Gould adds, rightly
assessing his book (it is difficult to do better): "So yes,
guilty as charged, and immensely proud of it! The most
adequate one-sentence description of my intent in writing
this volume flows best as a refutation to the claim of
paradox just above [...]" (1339). It is a long sentence, but
a good one, both in content and in form, structure, in its
continuous flow, which I punctuate a bit here:
This book attempts to expand and alter the premises of
Darwinism, in order to build an enlarged and distinctive
evolutionary theory that, while remaining within the
tradition, and under the logic, of Darwinian argument,
can also explain a wide range of macroevolutionary
phenomena lying outside the explanatory power of
extrapolated modes and mechanisms of microevolution, and
that would therefore be assigned to contingent
explanation if these microevolutionary principles
necessarily build the complete corpus of general theory
in principle. To restate just the two most obvious
examples of the higher tiers of time exemplified in this
chapter: (1) punctuated equilibrium establishes, at the
second tier, a general speciational theory of cladal
trending, capable of explaining a cardinal
macroevolutionary phenomena that has remained stubbornly
resistant to conventional resolution in terms of
adaptive advantages to organisms, generated by natural
selection and extrapolated through geological time; (2)
catastrophic mass extinction at the third tier suggests
a general theory of faunal coordination far in excess
[...] of what Darwinian microevolutionary assumptions
about the independent history of lineages under
competitive models of natural selection could possibly
generate. (1339-1340)
23. On the other hand, as I have indicated, while contingency
and, within contingency, randomness and chance, are
fundamental to Gould's theory of evolution, this theory
itself, even when dealing with contingency, is, as is
Darwin's, ultimately more interested in causality, /without
the ultimate cause/, than in chance /as such/. The
qualification is, again, crucial, for "following Hutton,
Lyell, and many other great thinkers," Darwin "foreswore (as
beyond the realm of science) all inquiry into the ultimate
origins of things" (SET 101). In particular and most
significantly, this attitude is correlative to the view that
the key causalities, either more Darwinian or more Gouldian,
in question in the theory are initiated by random events.
These events must thus also be treated structurally as
/discontinuous/ in relation to these new causal chains as in
relation to previous causal chains. In other words, the
dynamics of these chains is initiated by but does not depend
on and is dissociated from what triggers them. The absence
of the single overall teleology, or a single overall
archeology (the ultimate origin), of evolution follows
automatically. While incorporating Darwinian mutations (as
of secondary significance, without the ultimate creative
evolutionary force), Gould's theory also deals with causal
sequences resulting from or shaped by random events, such as
punctuations, and in itself /qua/ theory concerns only these
/causal/ sequences, and not random events initiating or
affecting them. As in Darwin's case, the specific character
of the causalities in question, however, gives this theory
its explanatory and descriptive power, and Gould's book
offers ample evidence of this power along both lines,
Darwinian and Gouldian, or in joining them.
24. Gould's concept of contingency is subordinated and indeed
defined by the agenda just explained. To restate his
definition, contingency is "/the tendency of complex systems
with substantial stochastic components, and intricate
nonlinear interactions among components, to be unpredictable
in principle from full knowledge of antecedent conditions,
but fully explainable after time's actual unfoldings/" (46;
emphasis added). Analogously (although not identically) to
chaos or complexity theory, the dynamics in question are
highly nonlinear but ultimately causal, although, in
contrast to most situations considered by chaos or
complexity theory, these dynamics are, again, initiated by
random events. More accurately, these events are seen as
random in the context of evolution and may be causal in
other contexts, geological, cosmic, or others, but, if they
are causal in these latter contexts, these causalities (say,
those responsible for the collisions between the Earth and
asteroids that destroyed so many well-adapted species) are
bracketed. They are not part of the structure of
evolutionary theory. Accordingly, Gould's concept of
contingency is well suited to the workings of punctuation or
other nonadaptational events and forces at work in evolution
that he considers. As will be seen, however, some chance
events in evolution, such as, possibly, mutations, may not
be bracketed in this way, although they are of course in
Darwin's theory. And yet they may still need to be left to
chance, without any hope of theorizing any causality behind
them. Would theorizing such events, with or without
causality behind them, be part of Gould's new synthesis, or
does he merely mean expanding causal macroevolutionary
patterns initiated by random events and their relationships,
positive or negative, to microevolutionary dynamics? Could
it be, once causality is suspended? Could they be theorized?
What would the theory of chance events without causality
behind them or of particulars without relations to the whole
be, and what kind of explanatory specificity could it offer?
I shall return to these questions below. A broader
overarching point can be made now, however, to convey one of
the most important lessons of this book.
25. Evolutionary theory may demand from us as complex a
combination of chance and causality (or necessity) as we can
develop, indeed many a complex combination of both, to a
degree of complexity arguably unique in the natural
sciences. It is true that, if we consider physics as a
conglomerate of its various theories, one can make a similar
case there as well. Indeed, as will be seen, one of the key
questions here is what a general or unified theory joining
such theories, say, as branches of a single tree, would be,
if it were possible. For the moment, Gould's argument is
that, along with the Darwinian contingency (as part of a
more gradual dynamics of evolutionary change), random
discontinuous punctuation is an equally and even more
significant force of change, thus leading him to a more
radical and more complex concept of evolutionary
contingency. The contingency part of this argument (whereby
causal chains are initiated or reshaped by chance events
that themselves are not included in these chains and are,
thus, also discontinuous from them) is, again, decisive. We
may need still more complex structure(s) of contingency,
however, extending the spectrum of contingency, and thus of
both chance and causality, even further. In the case of the
history of life, of its, to cite, with Gould, Shakespeare's
most famous lines from The Tempest, continuous, incessant
"sea change into something rich and strange," we might need
to do so as much as we possibly can (The Tempest I, ii, 403;
SET 24).
26. With this argument for a necessarily broad spectrum of
causality, chance, and contingency in mind, the question
becomes that of the character of chance as such. In
particular, the question is whether chance is a
manifestation of causality or necessity, however hidden or
remote, or not. These two alternatives define the two
concepts of chance that I shall discuss--/classical/, which
entails a hidden causality or necessity behind chance, and
/nonclassical/, in which case we /do not/ or even /cannot/
assume any causality behind it. Nonclassical contingency is
defined, accordingly, as contingency involving nonclassical
chance in one way or another, which is the case in Darwin's
or Gould's view of evolutionary contingency. It is worth
qualifying that for the moment I am concerned with what is
/responsible/ for chance, with the effects of /chance/, with
/random/ effects, as opposed to the effects /of/ chance
events upon a given causal dynamics or engendering new
causalities, the main concern of Darwin and Gould. Their
argument for giving chance a shaping role in evolution,
however, remains important in this context as well. For, as
explained above, in relation to the dynamics these
interruptive events (such as mutational variations or
exterior punctuations) trigger or enter, they are
nonclassical, even if the dynamics responsible for the
emergence of such events is classical (causal), since this
dynamics itself is not included in evolutionary theory. The
unpunctuated evolutionary dynamics occurring between such
events is considered by the theory as causal or classical,
which may not be the case elsewhere, for example, in quantum
theory, and, as I indicated above, mutations may need to be
considered in a more radically nonclassical way.
27. By "chance" itself, it is worth reiterating, I mean a
manifestation of the unpredictable (possibly within some
dynamics of contingency, as the interplay of causality and
chance). A chance event is an unpredictable, random event,
whether it ultimately hides some underlying causal dynamics,
as in the case of /classical/ chance, or not, as in the case
in /nonclassical/ chance. For example, when they occur in
classical physics, randomness and probability result from
insufficient information concerning systems that are at
bottom causal. It is their complexity (due, say, to the
large numbers of their individual constituents, as in the
kinetic theory of gases) that prevents us from accessing
their causal behavior and making deterministic predictions
concerning this behavior. I here distinguish causality and
determinism. I use "causality" as an /ontological/ category
relating to the behavior of the systems whose /evolution/ is
defined by the fact that the state of a given system is
determined at all points in time by its state at a given
point. (In the present context, causal and classical are the
same.) I use "determinism" as an /epistemological/ category
having to do with our ability to predict exactly the state
of a system at any and all points once we /know/ its state
at a given point.
28. In physics, classical mechanics deals deterministically with
causal systems; classical statistical physics deals with
causal systems, but only statistically, rather than
deterministically; and chaos theory or complexity theory
deals with systems that are, in principle, causal, but whose
behavior cannot be predicted even in statistical terms in
view of the highly nonlinear character of this behavior.
Gould's evolutionary contingency involves an analogous
causal stratum, although the specific dynamics operative
there differs from that of complexity theory, for example,
as developed in the evolutionary context in Kauffman's work.
All these theories are /causal/ and hence classical insofar
as they deal, deterministically or not, with systems that
are assumed to behave causally, in contrast to quantum
theory and possibly evolutionary theory. Quantum theory
offers predictions, of a statistical nature, concerning the
systems that /may not be/ and, in most versions of the
theory, indeed /cannot be considered as causal/ or, more
generally, subject to any realist description, and thus the
events such systems trigger cannot be "fully [or even
partially] /explainable/ after time's actual unfoldings,"
along the lines of Gould's contingency. Quantum theory only
predicts, statistically, certain events (in the manner of
outcomes of tossing dice) but does not explain the physical
processes through which these events come about. Even though
the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are
subject to rigorous mathematical laws, in this case, in
contrast to that of classical statistical physics,
randomness and probability do not arise in view of our
inability to access the underlying causal dynamics
determining the behavior of quantum systems.[6 <#foot6>] It
does not appear possible to assume such a behavior to be
causal. Accordingly, in quantum mechanics we confront
nonclassical chance in the case of /all events/ considered
by the theory, /without/ assigning or assuming any
/causality/ between these events, rather than only in the
case of certain events punctuating causal chains, as in the
case of evolutionary theory and its dynamics of contingency.
Although not without parallels or predecessors elsewhere,
the physical theories just described are our primary
scientific and mathematical-scientific models of chance,
including in biology and evolutionary theory, which cannot
as yet escape "physics envy," even when they exercise proper
ambivalence in this attitude (SET 1209).
29. Classically, then, chance or, it follows, the /appearance/
of chance is seen as arising from our insufficient (and
perhaps, in practice, unavailable) knowledge of a total
configuration of the forces involved and, hence, of a lawful
causality that is always postulated behind an apparently
lawless chance event. If this configuration becomes
available, or if it could be made available in principle,
the chance character of the event would disappear. Chance
would reveal itself to be a product of the play of forces
that, however complex, is, at least in principle if not in
practice, calculable by man, or at least by God, who, in
this view, indeed does not play dice, as Einstein famously
said, or at least always knows how they will fall. In other
words, /in practice/, we only have partially available,
incomplete information about chance events, which are,
nonetheless, determined by, /in principle/, a complete
architecture of causality or necessity behind them. This
architecture itself may or may not be accessible in full or
even partial measure. The presupposition of its existence
is, however, essential for and defines the classical view as
causal and, correlatively, realist. Subtle and complex as
they may be, all scientific theories of chance and
probability prior to Darwin's evolutionary theory (and then,
still more radically, quantum theory), and many beyond them,
as well as most philosophical theories of chance, are of the
type just described. They are classical. Combined, two of
Alexander Pope's famous utterances, the closing of Epistle 1
of An Essay on Man and his "Proposed Epitaph for Isaac
Newton," encapsulate the classical view of chance or,
conversely, causality and law:
All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good:
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear: Whatever IS, is RIGHT.
(An Essay on Man, Epistle 1, 289-94)
Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;
God said, let Newton be! and all was light.
30. Gould cites the immediately following passage from An Essay
of Man, opening Epistle 2, which considers the nature of
man, while Epistle 1 considers the /nature/ of nature
itself, as best seen by man, or by best men. Women are yet
another subject in Pope. On the other hand, some women
writers, such as Emily BrontC+, invoked by Gould alongside
Tolstoy, give us a more subtle perspective on the world, as
defined by chance and contingency (SET 1340). In the passage
cited by Gould, Pope writes:
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of Mankind is Man.
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great [...]
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;
In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;
In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer.
Born but to die, and reas'ning but err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd;
Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd;
Created half to rise, and half to fall;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl'd:
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!
(An Essay on Man, Epistle 2, 1-18)
31. I give a slightly fuller quotation, including the first two
lines, which tell us that, as far as science is concerned,
we no longer need to appeal to any theological
considerations, as (the genius of) Newton is sufficient, but
also necessary--a necessary and sufficient condition, as
mathematicians say. This passage appears at an important
juncture of Gould's book, in the opening chapter of Part II,
"Toward a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory," as he
begins his build-up of his revisionist theory, from the
argument concerning, to cite the title of the chapter,
"Species as Individuals in the Hierarchical Theory of
Selection" (SET 680). It is hardly surprising that Gould
sees Pope's passage "as composed for a quite different, but
/interestingly related/ purpose" (680; emphasis added).
Pope's biological, geological, and cosmological examples and
hierarchies are of much interest here. To be sure, Pope's
pre-Darwinian and even pre-Linnaen "chain of beings" is well
short of evolution. It can, however, be given a
teleological, directed historical and thus evolutionary
dynamics. Undirected and contingent history is a far more
radical and difficult move, which requires the genius of
Darwin. With Darwin and then with new non-Newtonian physics,
at God's command or not, a different light appears and
different night must be assumed. Man's view, even at its
best, may be even more "parochial" (Gould's word) than Pope
thought, its parochialism lying, ironically, in the
assumption of a plan in this maze of Nature--"a mighty maze!
but not without a plan" (Epistle 1, 6)--or of
"God-does-not-play-dice" necessity and order in this "one
stupendous whole" (Epistle 1, 267), or, for that matter, in
an assumption of wholeness or oneness, even while renouncing
any possible understanding of this plan in its working
specificity. Einstein would not be quite so modest and would
aim to know how it all works. Bohr, in response, argued
that, in order to do quantum theory, we might have to be
even more modest than Pope urges us to be. As Gould says:
The problem can be summarized with another, much older,
classical quotation. "Man is," as Protagoras wrote in
his wonderfully ambiguous epigram, "the measure of all
things"--ambiguous, that is, in embodying both positive
and negative meanings: positive for humanistic reasons
of ubiquitous self-valuing that might lead to some form
of universal brotherhood and compassion; but negative
because our own "measure" can be so parochially
limiting, and therefore so conducive to misunderstanding
other scales if we must assess these various domains by
the allometric properties of our limited estate. (680-81)
32. Ultimately, this parochialism may be irreducible. Gould, in
the epilogue, offers a powerful critique of the classical
view in science. Thus, he says:
I confess that, after 30 years of teaching at a major
university, I remain surprised by the unquestioned
acceptance of this view of science--which, by the way, I
strongly reject for the reasons exemplified just
below--both among students headed for a life in this
profession, and among intellectually inclined people in
general. If, as a teacher, I suggest to students that
they might wish to construe probability and contingency
as ontological properties of nature, they often become
confused, and even angry, and almost invariably respond
with some version of the old Laplacean claim [of the
underlying ultimate causality of nature]. In the short,
they insist that our use of probabilistic inference can
only, and in principle, be an epistemological
consequence of our mental limitations, and simply cannot
represent an irreducible property of nature, which must,
if science works at all, be truly deterministic. (1333)
At least it must be truly causal, on the present definition.
On the other hand, one should not perhaps be surprised,
given that the classical view has the backing of a great
many major figures in modern science and beyond it,
beginning with Einstein, for whom quantum mechanics was
almost not science on these very grounds.
33. Inspired by, among others, Lucretius (whose well-known
passages could also be cited here), Milton's description of
chaos in Paradise Lost gives us a subtler picture of chance:
Before thir [Satan's, Sin's and Death's] eyes in sudden
view appear
The secrets of the hoary deep, a dark
Illimitable Ocean without bound,
Without dimension, where lengths, breadth, and highth,
And time and place are lost; where eldest /Night/
And /Chaos/, ancestors of Nature, hold
Eternal Anarchy, amidst the noise
Of endless worth, and by confusion stand.
[...] /Chaos/ Umpire sits,
And by decision more imbroils the fray
By which he Reigns: next his high Arbiter
/Chance/ governs all. Into this wild Abyss,
The Womb of Nature, and perhaps her Grave,
Of neither Sea, nor Shore, not Air, nor Fire,
But all of these in thir pregnant causes mixed
Confus'dly, and which this must ever fight,
Unless th's Almighty Maker them ordain
His dark materials to create more Worlds,
(Book II, 890-916)
This extraordinary vision is closer to the nonclassical view
of chance, if not quite as radical by giving God at least a
chance to govern chance and shape it into order. It should
be noted, though, that the view of chaos given here is how
Satan and his family entourage see it, and it may be that,
as in Pope, in Milton, too, there would be no randomness and
chaos at the ultimate level, unavailable to anyone "except
to God alone" (Book III, 684).
34. In any event, to reach the conceptual-epistemological
structure of evolutionary theory, as advocated by Gould, one
needs to remove God from the structure here proposed, or
again, with Darwin, "foresw[ear] (as beyond the realm of
science) all inquiry into the ultimate origins of things"
(SET 101). From this perspective, evolutionary processes are
seen as giving rise to causal sequences and ordered
structures without presupposing the overall underlying or
primordial causality or order, either exterior or integrated
into the evolutionary process. Random impacts upon evolution
may, again, come either from within, through mutations or
constraints, for example, or from exterior punctuations. In
question is, accordingly, first, the interplay of chance and
causality (or necessity), and, then, the order (life is a
highly ordered phenomenon) emerging from it, and, second,
the specific character of chance and causality involved, or
of their interplay. There may be many variations on how new
formations, such as new species, in the biological evolution
may arise or are destroyed. As I have stressed throughout,
"expanded evolutionary theory" conceived by Gould, is
defined by the great complexity of these relations, and we
might need a greater complexity still.
35. The Romantics, such as HC6lderlin, Kleist, Keats, and Shelley
would, in Shelley's words, "take the darker side" (Julian
and Maddalo 49), and bring us at least to the threshold of
nonclassical chance. Gould places Darwin between the
Enlightenment and Romanticism, with the help of his
grandfather Erasmus (much revered by Darwin), who, I would
add, was an important and often equally revered figure for
both traditions, and especially for Shelley (SET 595).
Shelley's The Triumph of Life, which presents a
tragic-triumphant procession of life or/as death (it is
true, of human life) that is hardly a pageant (which Gould
favors) stops, remarkably, on an as-yet unanswered question:
"What is Life?" (The Triumph of Life 544). The poem
intimates that all life, biological or other, may be shaped
and even ultimately governed by nonclassical chance. While
remarkable, it is not by chance, given Shelley's biography,
and specifically his interest in contemporary science. Mary
Shelley's Frankenstein, for which Shelley wrote a preface,
is shaped by the spectrum of scientific themes shared with
Shelley's work, and by this question "What is Life?". Gould
mentions the novel, via Shakespeare's famous lines--"Nothing
in him that doth fade/But does suffer a sea-change/Into
something rich and strange"--from The Tempest (I.ii.401-03),
the work multiply connected with Shelley's work, including
The Triumph of Life. Gould, at least at this juncture, takes
a more positive view, as does Mary Shelley. Shakespeare's
lines, Gould reminds us, "appear on the tombstone of the
great poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (also the author of the
preface to his wife's novella, Frankenstein, which cites
Erasmus Darwin in its first line of text). I believe that
these words would suit, and honor, Charles Darwin just as
well and just as rightly" (SET 24). These words, it may be
added, also offer as good a description as any of
evolutionary change. There is, however, a darker side, along
with "grandeur" to Darwin's "view of life," to cite the
conclusion of The Origin of Species, the side that brings
his view of life as life-death and of chance closer to
Shelley's in The Triumph of Life. In Paul de Man's words,
"The Triumph of Life warns us that, /nothing/, whether deed,
word, thought or text, /ever/ happens in relation, positive
or negative, to anything that preceded, follows, or exists
elsewhere, but only as a random event whose power, like the
power of death, is due to the randomness of its occurrence"
(122; emphasis added). De Man also stresses, however, that,
while it retains the underlying overall economy of chance,
thus reversing the classical view (where causality underlies
chance), Shelley's poem also teaches us that causal
sequences do shape certain events. It also tells us how we
may integrate irreducibly random events into classical-like
causal sequences, which we often continue to prefer, as
Gould noted above, but which may not be rigorously possible.
36. Nonclassical chance, then, is irreducible to any causality
or necessity, not only in practice but, at the limit, also,
and most fundamentally, in principle. There is no
argumentation offered and there may be none in principle
available to us that would allow us to eliminate chance and
replace it with the picture of causality or necessity behind
it. Nor, however, does one or, again, at the limit, can one
postulate a causal dynamics as unknown or even unknowable
but existing behind random events. This qualification is
crucial. For, as I explained, some forms of the classical
understanding of chance allow for and are defined by this
type of assumption. The nonclassical chance is irreducibly
random.
37. At the very least, it is irreducibly random within the field
demarcated by a given theory, as in the evolutionary theory
of Darwin and Gould, where random events in question may
result from some exterior causality, as against quantum
mechanics where all events in question in the theory are
nonclassically random and are, thus, within the domain of
the theory. Unlike in Milton and Pope, in Gould's theory one
is not concerned with the ultimate theological determination
of the world (classical, by definition), but only with the
specific scientific explanations of evolutionary dynamics.
For example, one is not concerned with who or what arranged
for the asteroid to hit the earth 65 or so millions years
ago (seconds on the cosmological scale, and we, as a
species, have been or will be around much less) or other
catastrophes that punctuated and changed evolution. One is
only concerned with how such events shape the workings of
evolution. As I said, more generally, if a given punctuation
or mutation has a causality behind it, this causality would
not be linked to the evolutionary causality/ies initiated or
affected by this punctuation or mutation. One might say that
mutation, too, functions as a form of punctuation in this
sense, although within a more gradual rather than
catastrophically ruptured dynamics. One could be concerned
with the causalities of such events in studying the motion
of asteroids, subject to classical mechanics or else chaos
theory. Understanding the specific nature of their motion is
essential, for example, if we want to prevent, if we can,
yet another chance event that would catastrophically change
the course of evolution and would eliminate us from the face
of the earth, would do us in, as it did the dinosaurs. That,
however, would entail shifting the theoretical context
outside the domain of evolutionary theory. In sum, in
Darwin's or Gould's theories, one theoretically deals with
causalities triggered by certain random events, such as
mutations or punctuations, rather than with these events
themselves in their own history, whether the latter is
classical or nonclassical. In other words, evolutionary
contingency in Darwin's and Gould's sense depends on the
nonclassicality of interrupting or punctuating events
shaping causal sequences the theory considered in a
classical, and specifically descriptive way, just as
classical physics does in considering its objects.
38. By contrast, in quantum theory, at least in certain
(nonclassical) interpretations of it, we deal only with
nonclassically shaped events, as opposed to causal
(classical) chains that such events would trigger, as they
may, for example, by virtue of their impact in the
macroworld, to which chains we can, then, apply classical
physics. Quantum theory is, accordingly, a theory of
predicting such events on the basis of other events of the
same type, without explaining (which may not be possible)
the process leading from one event to another. If one wants
a contrast to Gould's or Darwin's theory, quantum theory
/qua/ theory deals only with "punctuations," observed in the
classical world, (which justifies its name "quantum,"
originally given to it for related, if somewhat different,
reasons), and not with causalities or evolution they may
trigger in the classical macroworld. Moreover, it deals with
such events only by way of prediction and not description or
explanation, either at the macrolevel (where classical
physics takes over) or at the quantum microlevel, where any
theoretical analysis is, in Bohr's words, "/in principle/
excluded" (62). Accordingly, quantum mechanics is
nonclassical through and through.[7 <#foot7>]
39. Now, the question is whether the structure of evolutionary
theory involves this type of nonclassical stratum as
well--an unanswered or perhaps, in this form, unasked
question of Gould's book. Before I sketch my reasons for
asking this question, or rather by way of transition, I
would like to respond to the question that one might ask
concerning my general argument here on classical vs.
nonclassical chance, whether the latter is of a Gouldian (or
Darwinian) type or of a more radical quantum-mechanical
type. This question goes as follows. If the underlying
causal dynamics of chance, while presupposed, could /not/ be
known even in the classical case, what difference would the
introduction of nonclassical chance, that is, a suspension
of even an /assumption/ of causality behind chance, make?
Can assuming something that we cannot possibly know make a
difference? Indeed, as explained above, on Gould's or
Darwin's view it would not make that significant a
difference, since evolutionary theory does not deal with
chance events themselves but only with their effects, which
are causal sequences, treated classically. (The introduction
itself of such events is, again, crucial for the structure
of evolutionary theory.) Strange as it may seem, however, it
can make a difference. We know that, in view of the
so-called Bell's theorem, it does make a difference in
quantum theory. For the correctness of our theoretical
prediction of the outcomes of the experiments depends on
making or not making this assumption. In the words of
quantum physicist David Mermin,
Bell [...] demonstrated that there were circumstances
under which one /could/ [in fact] settle a question of
whether "something [a causal reality behind quantum
randomness] one cannot know anything about exists all
the same" [or not], and if quantum mechanics was
quantitatively correct in its predictions, the answer
was, contrary to Einstein's conviction, that it does
not. (124)
By contrast, for classical statistical physics or,
differently, chaos theory and complexity theory to be
correct in their predictions, we must presuppose an
underlying causal reality within the scope of the theory,
even though we cannot, even in principle, access it.
40. Accordingly, one might argue that, whenever we deal with a
theory where chance plays an essential role, the classical
or conversely nonclassical nature of this chance may prove
to be significant. Evolutionary theory is such a theory. A
certain nonclassicality is already introduced into it by
Darwin and extended by Gould (although the extension is
subject of much debate among evolutionary theorists). This
may be as much nonclassicality as Gould wants, and Gould's
macroevoluationary theory, defined by hierarchy,
punctuation, spandrels, and so forth may not need more,
although his general appeal of integrating contingency and
(causal) general theory may leave space for more. Gould does
not, however, here or, as far as I know, anywhere, discuss
chance and contingency of the type we encounter in quantum
theory or offer theoretical arguments of this (nonclassical)
type. On the other hand, microevolutionary dynamics may
require a kind of through-and-through quantum-mechanical
nonclassicality. Such may be the case, for example, if one
wants to address theoretically the nature of random
mutations as part of evolutionary theory, rather than see
them as microtransformations or micropunctuations, whose
biology is bracketed by the evolutionary theory, either
Darwinian or Gouldian (which incorporates Darwin on this
score). At most, it appears to be left to other theoretical
fields such as genetics, say, at the level of the molecular
biology and chemistry and physics it involves, apart from
evolutionary theory. If, however, as Gould argues in the
passage cited earlier, "random" mutations are not
necessarily "equally likely in all directions," and if we
want to understand how mutational dice are loaded (quantum
dice, we recall, are) and make this understanding part of
evolutionary theory, then the nature of such processes may
be in question, possibly involving nonclassical features of
the kind one finds in quantum theory. In the latter case, we
would confront epistemological complexities, as concerns the
possibility or impossibility of describing or explaining
this type of process, of the type we encounter in quantum
theory. There is a crucial difference. In quantum mechanics
we deal primarily with predictions concerning future events
on the basis of certain events that have previously
occurred. By contrast, in evolutionary theory, at least so
far, we deal with past events, whose "history" to some
previous events we might want to trace, in however limited a
fashion, which situation may lead to yet further theoretical
complexities. The considerations of the kind just outlined
may also arise in other interactions forming Gould's
"expansion of Darwin's reliance upon organismal selection
into a hierarchical model of simultaneous selection at
several levels of Darwinian individuality (gene, cell
lineage, organism, deme, species and clade)" (1340).
41. What would such a theory be? Would it be a theory of the
quantum-mechanical type, for example, or would it still
proceed along the lines of Darwin's or Gould's view of
contingency on a smaller scale?[8 <#foot8>] Whether such a
"unified" theory is possible is yet another question, to
which I shall return presently. It is not unlike the
question of a possible or impossible ultimate unified theory
in physics, which would unify quantum theory, as a
microlevel theory, and general relativity, as currently a
macrolevel theory, within a single theory, a string theory,
for example. Gould does not address these questions,
although it may be seen as shadowing his argument, for
example, in some of his discussions of genetic aspects of
evolution and debates surrounding them.
42. Gould, unavoidably, invokes classical physics, via the works
of d'Arcy Thomson, whose work, especially his famous On
Growth and Form, pioneered a rigorous application of
classical physics and related mathematics to biological
morphology, as Gould discusses in some detail (SET
1182-1214). Gould might have mentioned the related
morphological work of a great mathematician and d'Arcy
Thomson's fellow Aristotelian, RenC) Thom (the two last names
also share a signifier, a "form"), whom Gould only invokes
in a related context of catastrophe theories, one of Thom's
great contribution to mathematics (922). Gould also
discusses the more recent work of Stuart Kauffman in
complexity theory, of which Kauffman was one of the
pioneers, and which continues d'Arcy Thomson's tradition of
relating physics and biology and extends to new but
classical theories, on the present definition, although not
in Kaufmann's terminology. As explained above, there are
differences between classical physics, including classical
statistical physics, and chaos and complexity theories,
which compel Kaufmann to juxtapose them.[9 <#foot9>]
Interestingly enough, however, especially given the place of
contingency in Gould's thinking, quantum theory, a
paradigmatic and paradigmatically modern or indeed
postmodern theory of chance, does not find its place in the
book. The work in molecular biology, essential to modern
genetics, stemming in part from quantum theory and in part
initiated by quantum theorists, beginning with Erwin
SchrC6dinger's book What is Life?, which thus repeats
Shelley's question, is not part of the book either. But
then, as I said, no book, however long, is ever long enough.
43. As I argue here, however, Gould's contingency has crucial
nonclassical affinities with quantum theory, and he could
not avoid quantum theory altogether, at least by
implication. One of the more remarkable junctures of
personal, historical, philosophical, and scientific
trajectories defining the book occurs around the case of the
so-called "quantum evolution" theory (introduced in the
1940s). The name is an inevitably evocative title or, one
might say, signifier. I do not want to overstress the
significance of this signifier, especially given that the
signified behind it is far from the (micro)considerations of
the quantum-theoretical type here discussed. It is in fact
closer to Gould's macroevolutionary theory, and this is why
Gould discusses it. Moreover, as Gould shows (which is one
of his points), quantum evolution theory progressed from its
more radical to its more conventional form, maintaining the
same terms or signifiers but subtly shifting its concepts
(SET 521-531). Nevertheless, it is not out of place to speak
of a shadow of the quantum over Gould's argument and
evolutionary theory, or conversely the shadow of Darwin,
arguably the first step toward the nonclassical view of
chance in science, over quantum theory. (There are also
actual historical lineages and influences.)
44. One can, then, sum up the preceding argument as follows.
First, the structure of evolutionary theory is fundamentally
determined by whether we assume that the character of chance
that shapes the contingencies of evolution is classical or
nonclassical, or combines both, which, I would argue with
Gould, is in fact the case, even given the more limited,
Gouldian or Darwinian, form of nonclassicality. Second, the
nature and the structure of evolutionary theory, arguably
more so than that of any other single scientific theory,
requires a maximal and multilevel deployment of both views
and of their many combinations. In paradigmatic terms of
physical theories, it needs the structures of causality and
chance, and of their interplay, contingency, on the model of
classical physics at some junctures; on the model of
classical statistical physics at others; on the model of
chaos and complexity theory at still others; and possibly
(as we have only seen intimations of it so far) on still
other models, such as those of quantum theory (which has
different levels and versions in turn). The deployment of
such models in evolutionary theory may be qualitative or
quantitative, mathematical or nonmathematical, and so forth.
But evolutionary theory may also need its own models, such
as Darwin's or Gould's. Accordingly, it may demand from us
the ultimate complexity in the domain of natural science and
already engages this type of complexity. This is, I would
argue, what Gould's book teaches us, or this is how it
answers or rather /asks/ Shelley's question "What is Life?"
45. But would it be, could it be one evolutionary theory, then,
even with multiple structures, and in what sense of oneness?
Gould appears to suggest or wants to see it as possibly a
single theory. His commentary in his epilogue on Darwin's
famous passage ending The Origin of Species is of some
interest in this respect. To cite Darwin's great final
sentence first:
There is grandeur to this view of life, with its several
powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator
into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this
planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of
gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most
beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being
evolved. (490)
Gould turns this sentence around and turns around it, in a
kind of mutual dance, a few times in his epilogue, beginning
with this elegant turn:
Note how Darwin contrasts the dull repetitiveness of
planetary cycling (despite the elegance and simplicity
of its quantitative expression) with the gutsy glory of
rich diversity of life's ever rising and expanding tree.
Darwin even gives his metaphor a geometric flavor, as he
contrasts the horizontal solar system, its planets
cycling around a central sun to nowhere, with the
vertical tree of life, starting in utmost simplicity at
the bottom, and rising right through the horizontality
of this repetitive physical setting towards the heavenly
heights of magnificent and ever expanding diversity, in
a contingent and unpredictable future of still greater
possibility. (SET 1334)
46. Perhaps! The "utmost simplicity" at bottom only appears at
the expense of the contingent event of enormous complexity,
that is the origin of life, which, it is true, is properly
bracketed in Darwin's and Gould's theories alike, but need
not be, and no longer is, seen in terms of absolute origins.
The future is far less certain, too. We also know (it is
true, better than Darwin did) how complex the structure
(more likely chaos) of the solar system is, let alone the
nature, so far unfathomable, of gravitation, thanks to
Einstein's theory. I am of course not aiming these arguments
against Darwin, who could not know them, or indeed against
Gould, who is well aware of them. Besides, Gould's main
point here is a historical particularity, contingency, of
/Darwin's/ view of life, as opposed to other possible views,
to which I shall return presently. For the moment, I want to
look at the image and indeed the concept of the tree--the
tree of life and the tree of evolutionary theory--as
governing Darwin and, via the image of Scilla's coral,
Gould's view of both life itself and evolutionary theory.
The tree of life (one would expect this) appears in the
final sentence of Gould's book as well. Even as it maps a
radical revision of Darwin, this "vertical" view of
evolutionary theory still implies a certain unifying
attitude, whereby theories or sub-theories branch from a
single ultimate lineage, without (ever?) leaving the tree
and its hierarchy behind. Could it be the case even within
evolutionary theory? Is it not possible to think of a
different theoretical structure here (or, as I said, in
physics as well) whereby we have a certain "horizontal"
field of theories, interactive but not genealogically linked
as branches within a single tree, theories that are
heterogeneously interactive and interactively heterogeneous?
This view may even be necessary if we want to pursue "the
generation of theories appropriate to the characteristic
rates and modalities of time's higher tiers to explain the
extensive range of macroevolutionary phenomena," on which
Gould insists (1340).
47. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari would speak of "rhizome,"
which they juxtapose to "tree," although they, correctly,
acknowledge that we need both types of structuration.
Rhizome may still be too connected. Horizontality, however,
and the suspension of any ultimate hierarchy are crucial.
One could think in particular of the extraordinary Chapter
3, "10,000. B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth
Think It Is?)," of A Thousand Plateaus, the book that also
offers a correlatively rhizomatic philosophy of history
(39-74). The title obviously alludes to Nietzsche's On the
Genealogy of Morals, so crucial to Gould but perhaps not
followed by him to its ultimate Nietzschean limits,
including on this point, that of heterogeneous, if
interactive, genealogies of and relationships between
different theories or different practices of morality. But
the chapter explores, naturally, in philosophical, rather
than scientific, terms and in an allegorical mode, the
structure of--among others--evolutionary theory, including
its relation to the geological and cosmological forces that
shaped it. (It also contains an ironic play upon the title
of Darwin's Descent of Man.) In the process it also suggests
that this structure may take the horizontal, rhizomatic,
theoretical field. I can, however, only indicate this
problematic here. To properly address it would require the
scale of Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus (about
600 pages), if not of Gould's book. Instead, I would like to
close by returning, with Gould, to contingency.
48. Gould adds an epilogue to his epilogue, on contingency in
literature vs. science, thus finally ending his
"interminable book" on a triple synthesis--philosophical,
scientific, and cultural--of causality and chance, of two
types of evolutionary theory, and, finally (and not
coincidentally, only contingently), of science and
literature, all of which are represented in Darwin's work
and life (1342-43). The subject, in all three of its
aspects, is implicitly linked to a slightly earlier
discussion of Darwin's "tree of life" and Kauffman's
critique of it from complexity theory, on contingency in
immanent and narrative style of explanations and modes of
knowing correlative to them, and then to the discussion of
contingency in history and biography (1335-37, 1338-39). Now
Gould "risks" (chances) "a final statement about contingency":
And yet, as an epilog to this epilog and, honest to God,
a true end to this interminable book, I risk a final
statement about contingency, both to explicate the
appeal of this subject, and to permit a recursion to my
starting point in the most remarkable person and career
of Charles Robert Darwin. Although contingency has been
consistently underrated (or even unacknowledged) in
stereotypical descriptions of scientific practice, the
same subject remains a perennial favorite among literary
folk, from the most snootily arcane to the most
vigorously vernacular--and it behooves us to ask why.
(1340)
49. It is at this juncture that Gould invokes BrontC+'s Wuthering
Heights (1340). It is a pity that in his first example of
Tolstoy's War and Peace, Gould, while correct in his
argument, makes a technical error. Tolstoy does indeed
argue, as Gould says, that "Napoleon's defeat in Moscow in
1812 rested upon a thicket of apparently inconsequential and
independent details, and not upon any broad and abstract
claim about the souls of nations or the predictable efficacy
of Russia's two greatest generals, November and December"
(1340). I would contend that it rested on both, as the
predictable evolution of the French campaign was also
"punctuated" by the generals in question, while BrontC+'s or
earlier Stendhal's (a key precursor of Tolstoy, not
mentioned by Gould) would be closer to the
quantum-mechanical view of chance. (Actually one finds both
conceptions in Stendhal.) In any event, Tolstoy does not
argue this in "both prefaces," as Gould mistakenly says, but
in both of his epilogues, just as Gould himself does--a
missed chance by Gould.
50. Gould's own answer to his question is roughly that
literature or art aims at the extraordinary, even in the
ordinary, which could only be contingent and even singular,
unique. Phenomena like Darwin or Newton, and their work and
writings, are in the same category, as are certain phenomena
in science itself. Gould says:
We care for the same reasons we love okapis, delight in
the fossil evidence of trilobites, and mourn the passage
of the dodo. We care because the broad events that had
to happen, happened to happen /in a certain particular
way/. And something almost unspeakably holy--I don't
know how else to say this--underlies our discovery and
confirmation of the actual details that made our world
and also, in realms of contingency, assured the minutiae
of its construction in the manner we know, and not in
any one of a trillion other ways, nearly all of which
would not have included the evolution of a scribe to
record the beauty, the cruelty, the fascination, and the
mystery. (1342)
51. He adds: "no difference truly separates science and art in
this crucial respect. We only perceive a division because
our disparate traditions lead us to focus upon different
scales of identity" (1343). More specifically, the
situation, according to Gould, is as follows. A different
history of evolutionary theory or of physics (Newton is
mentioned next, by way of the fact that Darwin is buried
next to him in the Westminster Abbey), without Darwin or
Newton, would be unlikely to change our theories of either
physical nature or evolution. (To follow Gould's view of
biological evolution, the contingencies of the
macroevolution of culture could do so, since they could
deprive or relieve us of science, or of art, altogether.)
This different history would, however, change our
/experience/ of either science or the history of both, in
their particulars, as against those particulars that the
work of Newton or that of Darwin brought into them. "We
would [still] be enjoying an evolutionary view of life, but
not the specific grandeur of 'this [Darwin's] view of life'"
(1343). We would still be asking Shelley's question "What is
Life?," but not in the way it is asked by Shelley's poem, or
by us after Shelley and Darwin, or both Darwins, Charles and
Erasmus. Other particulars, perhaps equally grand, would
take their place. Gould undoubtedly knew full well that this
argument equally applies to his book, or his particular way
of asking this question, Shelley's and Darwin's, the
question of art and the question of science, and now (it's
been for a while, actually) Gould's, "What is Life?." Or,
again, doubling the question mark, how do we ask this
question, "What is Life?"?
Theory and Cultural Studies Program
Purdue University
aplotnit@sla.purdue.edu
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Notes
1 <#ref1>. "Spandrel" and "exaptation" are Gould's key
concepts developed in this central chapter (1214-95).
2 <#ref2>. Other interactive conceptual pairs or more
multiple clusters, such as, and especially, unity and
multiplicity, or general and particular, are significant as
well and could be correlated with the problematics in question.
3 <#ref3>. Democritus appears to speak of necessity, as
(with Democritus in mind) does Monod, which is not quite the
same as causality, and the difference is not without
significance in the present context. I shall, however, leave
the subject aside here, and use primarily causality, and
only invoke necessity on a few occasions.
4 <#ref4>. I follow Hermann Weyl's formulation of the
principle in his discussion of Riemann in his classic,
Space, Time, Matter (92).
5 <#ref5>. This is a major theme throughout Derrida's work,
whose connections to evolutionary conceptuality are yet
(thirty years in waiting) to be explored.
6 <#ref6>. These events may involve statistical
correlations, but without causal connections between the
events themselves.
7 <#ref7>. I cannot enter here into a detailed treatment of
quantum theory and instead permit myself to refer to my
discussion of the subject in The Knowable and the
Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical Theory, and the
"Two Cultures" and references therein.
8 <#ref8>. Were such transitions to involve quantum
processes, as is sometimes conjectured, they would, at least
in part, obey the quantum-mechanical model of chance, as
sketched here.
9 <#ref9>. It would not be possible to address Kauffman's
work here, in part in view of its technical complexity,
although this work and complexity theory in general feature
prominently in current discussions both in science and in
the humanities and social sciences.
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Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus.
Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass.
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Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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Mermin, N. David. Boojums All the Way Through: Communicating
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Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter
Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.
---. On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter
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Plotnitsky, Arkady. The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern
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