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A Time for Enlightenment
Chad Wickman
Kent State University
cwickman@kent.edu
(c) 2005 Chad Wickman.
All rights reserved.
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Review of:
Borradori, Giovanna. Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues
with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: U of Chicago P,
2003.
1. Giovanna Borradori's Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues
with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida stages an encounter
between two philosophers whose respective bodies of work are as
vast as they are vastly different from one another. For Borradori,
however, Habermas and Derrida share a common bond--each has looked
to the uses and the limits of Enlightenment philosophy for
perspective on current global crises, particularly those related
to 9/11. Borradori attempts to reveal this commonality by asking
similar questions in her conversations with Habermas and Derrida.
While there is no direct dialogue between Habermas and Derrida in
the book, readers can nonetheless see how the two contend with
each other and with contemporary issues ranging from global
terrorism to international law. Philosophy in a Time of Terror
invites readers to think about how philosophy can help us to
understand 9/11 and the crises of which it is part.
2. Although Habermas and Derrida have found ways to collaborate
politically (both, for instance, participated in the publication
of a May 2003 statement in the Frankfurter Allgemeine and La
Liberation that called for a unification of European foreign
policy as a response to U.S. hegemony in world affairs), that
collaboration has taken place in spite of certain basic
philosophical differences. One need look no further than
Habermas's critique of Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity, or Derrida's own familiar suspicions regarding the
universalism and rationality to which Habermas subscribes. Part of
Borradori's task is in that case to account for a dispute that has
long existed between Habermas and Derrida. In her introduction to
the volume, she describes how Enlightenment ideals figure
differently in Habermas's and Derrida's respective philosophies.
If, as part of the tradition of the Frankfurt School, Habermas
aims at an "improvement of the present human situation" dependent
on a "belief in principles whose validity is universal because
they hold across historical and cultural specificities," that
belief would seem to run up against Derrida's distrust of the
notion of the universal as that which can "impose a set of
standards that benefit some and bring disadvantage to others,
depending on context" (15-16). That Derrida also believes in a
responsibility that "articulates the demand for universalism
associated with the Enlightenment" suggests to Borradori that
there are important points of overlap between the two philosophers
(15-6). The connections Borradori makes between Habermas, Derrida,
and the Enlightenment offer a refreshing perspective on a
longstanding debate.
3. It would, however, be wrong to see Philosophy in a Time of Terror
as a treatise that seeks simply to unite these figures. While
Borradori is interested in identifying continuities between
Habermas and Derrida vis-à-vis the Enlightenment, she does so with
another interest in mind: to demonstrate how philosophy can help
make sense of global terrorism, 9/11, and the current state of
international relations and international law:
While for Habermas terrorism is the effect of the trauma of
modernization, which has spread around the world at a
pathological speed, Derrida sees terrorism as a symptom of a
traumatic element intrinsic to modern experience, whose focus
is always on the future, somewhat pathologically understood as
promise, hope, and self-affirmation. Both are somber
reflections on the legacy of the Enlightenment: the relentless
search for a critical perspective that must start with
self-examination. (22)
Borradori thus gestures towards themes that readers can expect to
find in the dialogues and reveals the critical perspective she
would have readers adopt as they "walk along the same path" as
Habermas and Derrida (48). Borradori clears this path for readers
by including essays that situate each dialogue within the larger
context of Habermas's and Derrida's work. Although the terms of
these summaries will be familiar to the already initiated, they
offer the uninitiated reader a chance to enter directly an ongoing
dialogue between Habermas and Derrida. It is to Borradori's credit
that her book allows readers to see so clearly how Habermas and
Derrida position themselves in relation to these pressing topics.
4. The terms of Borradori's questions reflect her broader aim of
understanding how Habermas and Derrida situate 9/11 in a cultural,
historical, and philosophical context. With her initial question,
for instance, she asks each to explain the significance of 9/11 as
an "event." Habermas, for his part, offers an historical analogy,
suggesting that 9/11 is similar to the outbreak of World War I in
that it "signaled the end of a peaceful and, in retrospect,
somewhat unsuspecting era" (26). He explains, however, that the
attack on the World Trade Center was itself unprecedented because
of "the symbolic force of the targets struck" (28). For Derrida,
the way the attack has been named--"as a date and nothing more"
(85)--signifies that "we perhaps have no concept and no meaning
available to us to name in any other way this 'thing' that has
just happened, this supposed 'event'" (86). We are not only unable
appropriately to name and, in doing so, to grasp the significance
of 9/11, but we must also live in a world where terrorist attacks
hinder our ability to carry on our lives. Since there is no way to
know when or where a terrorist attack might occur, a sense of
impending doom threatens us just as it keeps us from coming to
grips with terror already faced. Derrida writes, "there is
traumatism with no possible work of mourning when the evil comes
from the possibility to come of the worst, from the repetition to
come--though worse" (97). This is part of the power wielded by
terrorists. They do not seek to overthrow but to destabilize the
systems of countries such as the U.S. Indeed, it is through the
symbolic force of their acts, as Habermas suggests, that they
incite terror and, thereby, inflict their wounds.
5. Habermas and Derrida also share an interest in the ways in which
the rest of the world has been affected by and has responded to
the attack. For Habermas and Derrida, the Bush administration in
particular should be held accountable for its actions, which, they
agree, have tended to increase rather than reduce the potential
for violence. This criticism stems from the nature of global
terrorism and the administration's response to it. Today's
terrorists gain power not by overthrowing, but by destabilizing
the systems of world superpowers. Because terrorists work at the
level of the symbolic, they wage war without marching onto a
battlefield and cannot be defeated like a typical enemy. As
Habermas notes, "the global terror that culminated in the
September 11 attack bears the anarchistic traits of an impotent
revolt directed against an enemy that cannot be defeated in any
pragmatic sense" (34). This kind of conflict can benefit both
"sides": it benefits terrorists because it enables them to
continue to wage war on a world stage, and it benefits governments
like the U.S. because a "war on terror" is a useful political tool
for assuring that under-motivated military and political actions
will be tolerated indefinitely. This scenario may appear obvious
to some, but its specific mechanisms, as Habermas and Derrida make
clear, must be addressed if it is to be in any way ameliorated.
6. Habermas locates the potential causes of global terrorism in the
clash between religious fundamentalism and modernization. He sees
fundamentalism as analogous to a "repression of striking cognitive
dissonances" that "occurs when the innocence of the
epistemological situation of an all-encompassing world perspective
is lost and when, under the cognitive conditions of scientific
knowledge and of religious pluralism, a return to the exclusivity
of premodern belief attitudes is propagated" (32). This means that
for Habermas modernization is largely responsible for religious
fundamentalism. Secularization and economic growth, as exemplified
in and by the West, is a threat to many non-Western countries that
have been "/split up/ into winner, beneficiary, and loser
countries" (32). A country like the U.S. serves not only as a
model of what many countries strive to attain, but also "as a
scapegoat for the Arab world's own, very real experiences of loss,
suffered by populations torn out of their cultural traditions
during processes of accelerated modernization" (32).
7. While Derrida does not ignore the role that fundamentalism plays
in terrorist acts, he takes a different approach in explaining
what he feels are the origins of global terrorism. For him, global
terrorism is made possible by an "autoimmunitary process," meaning
that imperial powers in the West make possible the very attacks
that they hope to preempt. He writes, "as we know, an
autoimmunitary process is that strange behavior where a living
being, in quasi-/suicidal/ fashion, 'itself' works to destroy its
own protection, to immunize itself /against/ its 'own' immunity"
(94). Derrida categorizes autoimmunity in the case of 9/11 into
three moments of "reflex and reflection" that involve: 1) "the
Cold War in the head"; 2) "worse than the Cold War"; and 3) "the
vicious circle of repression." The first moment of "suicidal
autoimmunity" occurs when a country trains the people who will
later terrorize it. The second follows when the world is put at
risk by the "terrorists" who were initially enlisted as "freedom
fighters." No longer affiliated with the state that funded them,
these terrorists become a risk to a world that has no real way to
appease them other than to reverse the process of modernization
that helped make them powerful in the first place. The last
moment, according to Derrida, is exemplified by the war on
terrorism. As he suggests, such a "war" will continue to be waged
indefinitely since civilians and other insurgents, people who
consider the acts by countries such as the United States
terroristic, will continue to fight back using their own means.
For Derrida, this circle of violence will continue if left
unchecked by international law.
8. On the subject of international law, Habermas and Derrida share
similar ideals even if they endorse different methods for
realizing those ideals. It is also on the subject of international
law that their ties to the Enlightenment become most apparent.
While Habermas endorses universalism in various forms, he also
understands that universal concepts can be used ignominiously:
"the universalistic discourses of law and morality can be abused
as a particularly insidious form of legitimation since particular
interests can hide behind the glimmering façade of reasonable
universality" (42). By the same token, he claims, "just as every
objection raised against the selective or one-eyed application of
universalistic standards must already presuppose these same
standards, in the same manner, any deconstructive unmasking of the
ideologically concealing use of universalistic discourses actually
presupposes the critical viewpoints advanced by these same
discourses" (42).
9. Habermas's reliance upon universals is, of course, at odds with
Derrida's rejection of them. But readers might be surprised to
find that Derrida comes close to advocating the need for what
Habermas refers to as "universal discourses of law." Derrida writes:
Despite my very strong reservations about the American, indeed
European, political posture, about the "international
antiterrorist" coalition, despite all the de facto betrayals,
all the failures to live up to democracy, international law,
and the very international institutions that the states of
this "coalition" themselves founded and supported up to a
certain point, I would take the side of the camp that, in
principle, by right of law, leaves a perspective open to
perfectibility in the name of the "political," democracy,
international law, international institutions, and so on.
(113-14)
Derrida does not claim that international institutions are without
fault. Indeed, one of his most important critiques of
organizations such as the United Nations is that the countries
that make up those organizations do not always abide by the laws
they create. Still, as he suggests, international institutions and
the possibility of their "perfectibility" are necessary, for if
there is to be any semblance of stability or accountability in the
world, it must come about both through constant revision of
existing institutions and through their promise, and perhaps their
ability, to help establish and maintain open, equitable, and
peaceful relations among nations and peoples.
10. Both Habermas and Derrida see cosmopolitanism as one way to
achieve a modicum of peace and stability across the globe, but
neither would stop at achieving a cosmopolitan world order. For if
cosmopolitanism broadly construed implies the belief that all
individuals are citizens of the world, then the term itself
carries with it the possibility that people can be defined as
citizens within and apart from states to which they may or may not
belong as legal subjects. This notion has benefits--it could make
way for mutual respect and perspective-taking, for a start--but it
may also have drawbacks, particularly if being a citizen means
subjecting oneself to doctrinal laws and beliefs. It is a useful
concept if it is not seen as an end in itself. Accordingly,
Derrida offers a particular way to move beyond cosmopolitanism:
What I call "democracy to come" would go beyond the limits of
cosmopolitanism, that is, of a world citizenship. It would be
more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone) "live
together," there where they are not yet defined by
citizenship, that is, by their condition as lawful "subjects"
in a state or legitimate members of a nation-state or even of
a confederation or world state. (130)
While Derrida would do away with the nation-state, he would not
replace it with a world-state in which all peoples would be
"united" under a single regime as world citizens. Indeed, such a
position would limit his notion of "democracy to come." His notion
of "democracy to come" bypasses the limitations of cosmopolitanism
because it is less about individuals defined as lawful subjects or
citizens and more about living together as "singular beings."
"Democracy to come" can, then, be seen as the promise of an
equitable and perhaps peaceful future that is embodied in the
present. If seen in this way, Derrida offers not a solution to
specific problems of international law but, instead, a scenario
for readers to consider, an ideal that, even if not immediately
realizable, could nonetheless prompt thinking and dialogue.
11. Like Derrida, Habermas believes in cosmopolitanism but also notes
its flaws: "the ontologization of the friend-foe relation suggests
that attempts at a cosmopolitan juridification of the relations
between the belligerent subjects of international law are fated to
serve the masking of particular interests in universalistic
disguise" (38). Habermas sees cosmopolitanism as useful, but only
if the concept involves rational communication and what he calls
"mutual perspective-taking": "in the course of mutual
perspective-taking there can develop a common horizon of
background assumptions in which both sides accomplish an
interpretation that is not ethnocentrically adopted or converted
but, rather, /intersubjectively/ shared" (37). Habermas's ideal
vision, like Derrida's, invites readers to consider a world in
which citizens share an equal opportunity to live how they wish to
live, speak how they wish to speak, feel how they wish to feel.
Although both share a somewhat utopian vision, it is Derrida who
hits upon a crucial critique of such a world. He understands that
equitable communication as Habermas describes it would involve
universal access to the same type of reason. Derrida questions
universal reason, but he also considers the possibility of such
reason necessary when addressing issues of international law,
global terrorism, and globalization in general.
12. This implicit debate between Habermas and Derrida is, in fact,
most direct--and most lively--in their discussion of the notions
of tolerance and hospitality. Habermas emphasizes the notion of
tolerance, despite certain limitations. He understands that
tolerance is problematic in that the concept "possesses [in]
itself the kernel of intolerance" (41). This is so because
tolerance involves setting boundaries that one /allows/ others to
cross. In short, tolerance suggests that a stronger person or
nation allows a weaker person or nation to act as he, she, or it
pleases in relation to a certain limit. Beyond that limit,
tolerance devolves into intolerance. Habermas counters this
scenario by explaining how a constitutional democracy does not
involve a single person or group tolerating another: "On the basis
of the citizens' equal rights and reciprocal respect for each
other, nobody possesses the privilege of setting the boundaries of
tolerance from the viewpoint of their own preferences and
value-orientations" (41). Anticipating Derrida's critique of
tolerance, Habermas notes, "straight deconstruction of the concept
of tolerance falls into a trap, since the constitutional state
contradicts precisely the premise from which the paternalistic
sense of the traditional concept of 'tolerance' derives" (41).
13. Derrida picks up where Habermas leaves off, criticizing tolerance
while endorsing his own notion of hospitality: "Tolerance remains
a scrutinized hospitality, always under surveillance, parsimonious
and protective of its sovereignty" (128). As Derrida suggests,
tolerance does more to protect the hegemony of the person or state
that tolerates than it does to achieve equality. Opposed to this
necessarily limited tolerance is Derrida's hospitality: "Pure and
unconditional hospitality, hospitality /itself/, opens or is in
advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to
whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign /visitor/, as a new
/arrival/, nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly
other" (128-29). Given this definition of hospitality, it seems as
if Derrida chooses to ignore the concept's applicability. Not so.
As he writes, "an unconditional hospitality is, to be sure,
practically impossible to live; one cannot in any case, and by
definition, organize it" (129). This is not to say that
hospitality is impractical, even if it is "practically impossible
to live"; rather, it may be that the realization of the concept
lies in the ability or willingness of individuals, not
nation-states, to embrace it. Put another way, hospitality may be
realized in practice by individuals even if it may be unrealistic
at this historical moment for nation-states to do the same. In
this sense, hospitality at once resists unified organization by a
nation-state as it encourages unified understanding among
individuals who would accept it as a way of relating to others in
the world.
14. For Borradori, the realization of Derrida's vision is possible
only if philosophy plays a central role in understanding 9/11,
global terrorism, and international law. Indeed, part of her aim
in Philosophy in a Time of Terror is to think how philosophers
might be involved in helping the world understand and, perhaps,
mourn 9/11 and the events that have followed it. Habermas, for
one, does not seem to believe that intellectuals have a specific
role in offering the world ways to cope with 9/11 or with global
terrorism. He feels that we should exercise caution when
delegating responsibility to specific groups who may or may not
have the expertise to make informed decisions: "If one is not
exactly an economist, one refrains from judging complex economic
developments" (30). Derrida has a different vision of the
philosopher's role in dealing with the trauma provoked by 9/11:
"Though I am incapable of knowing who today deserves the name
philosopher . . . I would be tempted to call philosophers those
who, in the future, reflect in a responsible fashion on these
[Borradori's] questions and demand accountability from those in
charge of public discourse, those responsible for the language and
institutions of international law" (106). For Derrida, the
responsibility of the philosopher is to find responsible ways to
make sense out of tragedy, even if it means criticizing those very
countries that have been victims of global terrorism. He could,
that is, "condemn unconditionally . . . the attack of September 11
without having to ignore the real or alleged conditions that made
it possible" (107).
15. It is possible, I think, to take something from both Habermas's
and Derrida's positions. Habermas is right to suggest that
philosophers and intellectuals are not necessarily expert in all
areas of war and conflict and should not act as "armchair
strategists" (30). Derrida, in line with Borradori, offers
important insights as well. To understand global terrorism
requires that we understand its causes and effects. From economics
to politics, from international law to human rights, philosophy
provides a discourse that can help the world better understand and
learn from global terrorism, its effects, and its causes.
Ultimately, the dialogues in Philosophy in a Time of Terror reveal
that the differences between Habermas and Derrida outweigh the
similarities. Even so, readers have reason to find hope in the way
Habermas and Derrida consider each other's differences. And this,
I think, speaks to one of the most significant messages in
Philosophy in a Time of Terror. If Habermas and Derrida,
rationalism and deconstruction, have found ways to communicate, to
collaborate, then it is possible for others to do the same. It is
up to us to begin and to sustain dialogue with those of whom we
have tended to think without toleration.
Department of English
Kent State University
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