-
In his book Genesis, Michel Serres develops a philosophical
geometrics in which straight lines are equated with the line of reason:ing
that cuts through and thus wounds a more primary--both physical and
psychic--multiplicity. As Serres states, linking this fundamental
multiplicity to the concepts of chaos and noise: "The straight line of
reason... must turn its back on... chaos.... What noise does the
classical age repress, to what clamor does it close its ears, in order to
invent our rationalism?" (20-1).¶ In the book's rhetorical matrix,
the straight line is the figure of the age of reason and progress, and the
work of rationalizing is quite literally understood as surveying and as
road-work; the cutting of a concrete visto--an epistemological
highway--through an inherently multiplex nature. As Serres notes, "we
construct a real which is a rational one, we construct a real,
among many possibilities, which is a rational one, among other
possibilities, just as we pour concrete over the ground" (25). The
ultimate aim of this rational project, a.k.a. the Enlightenment (at least
in one of its many versions), is--as
the Frankfurt school had already diagnosed, in particular in Adorno's and
Horkheimer's The Dialectic of the Enlightenment--to gain
dominion and control; to create, in the words of a neo-Adornian such as
Jean Baudrillard, a state of overall operational simulation, in which the
real has become--or is treated as--the rational.¶ One might well
argue that this equation is what not only Genesis, but all of
Serres's work most consistently argues against--especially in its link to
political exploitation and to a state of deadly stasis--and it is this
"disenchantment of the world" that Serres's most vitriolic rhetorics are
directed against. As he argues in Hermes III, rationalism has
become
thanatocratic, a sentiment also echoed in Genesis: "the
stable chain of the rationalists only expresses... their desire of
domination. The empire is never more than some inflated local, a part that
took the place of the whole.... There is reason there, there is violence
there. There is order and growth there.... This chain is the chain of
reason, this chain is the chain of death.... Rationalism is a vehicle of
death" (72-3).¶ As the "other" to the rational line, Serres
envisions a living chain that is defined not by necessity
(Aristotle's ananké as the basis of rationalism), but by a
more complex combination of chance and probability (what Aristotle called
tyche and automaton respectively). This fragile, tangled
up, twisted and knotted chain is related to unpaved paths--like those used
by Native American people--rather than to concrete highways. Based as they
are on maze-like meanderings and the politics of soft transfers, the
geometrics of this chain evoke an eco:logical, "feng shui" science that
honors rather than wounds the natural contours of the landscape.¶
Because such unpaved, winding paths are often temporary and thus fluid and
dynamic, they de-linearize not only space but also time. They grow over
and vanish, like the wake of a ship on the ocean, or like traces of
footsteps on the smooth space of the prairie. As Serres states, "here
then is the chain: white sea or white plain, background noise, surge,
fluctuation of the surge, bifurcation, repetition, rhythm or cadence,
vortex. The great turbulence is constituted, it fades away, it breaks. And
disappears as it came.... This chain is not the chain of reasons.... Here
we are in liquid history and the ages of waters. It is the chain of
genesis. It is not solid. It is never a chain of necessity. Suddenly,
it will bifurcate. It goes off on a tangent. It surrenders to... the
fluctuations of the sea.... [It] is not a chain of
chance either, it would remain meticulously broken. It is a chain of
contingency [like a multiplex narrative].... A fragile
and soft chain, easily cut, fragments easily replaced, a chain almost
always broken.... It is the chain of life"(71-2).¶ Serres argues
that since the Enlightenment, science has separated its agenda from this
chain and has thrown in its lot with the straight line of rationalism, a
move through which it has also aligned itself to (and thus subjected
itself to) the latter's socio-political agenda. In that the sciences, like
the rational control systems, favor dialectical, dualistic thought, they
linearize and thus also martialize themselves. (In Serres's book La
Naissance de la Physique: Dans le Texte de Lucrèce: Fleuves et
Turbulences. [Paris: Minuit, 1977], this is negotiated as the
quarrel between Mars and Venus.) They "easily line themselves up
under the
relentless tyranny of bureaucracy" (105, emphasis added). Because
dialectics is logical and static "what is called dialectics is a rather
crude trick of the straight line's, a logic of carefully placed
invariants" (101). In opposition, "the work of transformation is that of
the multiple" (101).¶ Serres's claim is that in order to become alive
again, the various fields of science must once more open themselves up to
the fragile chain of being (or rather: the "chain of becoming") and of
genesis: "science must dissociate itself from it [the line of
rationalism]. The soft quasi-chain... glimpsed, sketched, faintly, its
local, tangential, contingent, aquatic drives and pulls, its open, free
and unstable links, this badly woven fabric, or these proximities almost
always abandoned as trials, attempts, essays, hold true... on occasion,
for inert, more often for the living, little for the pathological and
sometimes for the cultural, they hold true... for history" (73). [2]
-
A return from "linearization" to the chain of being:becoming and an opening
up of spaces of possibility implies the break-up of the borders defined
by the line of rationality. Only a chaotic, "attractive" writing--the
development of a "third (writing) space"--can "make a ruckus... in the
midst of... [the] dividing waters" (13) that make up a binary logic. In
contrast to such a transgressive un-dividing, rationalization, in science
as well as in social engineering, implies a mania for a sub-division that
is always in complicity with power and control. [3]
-
As Serres notes, "Division into subsets minimizes fury. Division into
subsets protects, preserves the unity of the body as a whole, because it
tempers... free energy and channels it" (85). In this context, cutting a
populace up into various groups, be it classes or castes, must be
recognized as a violent act of exerting power and control: "Some put trust
in the moving flux that does the coding and in its process, others put
trust in the topography that loses it, in the classifying labyrinth that
uses it up" (94). In these dynamics, "the more classification there is,
the less evolution there is, the more classes there are, the less history
there is, the more coded the sciences are, the more administrating there
is, the less movement there is" (94). Once more, the ultimate aim and
result of sub-division is the creation and maintenance of a state of
stasis brought about by a process of purification, which is why
"rationalists are priests, busily ruling out, cleaning up the filth,
expelling people, purifying bodies or ideas" (99). In fact, "politics...
have a function and a passion to reduce multiplicities, to reduce
possibilities, to work at the confluences" (24). It is to such agendas of
political order(ing)s that "alas! the multiple is always sacrificed" (31):
[4]
-
Unlike order, with its project of demarcation and purification, the
multiple is never (at) an end. Rather,
it is a permanent beginning and always "before" order. It is the condition
of existence in the sense of "presupposition": ("the surge is
first--conditional" [97]) which, once it is ordered (when it "lies still
and stands stagnant" [97]) becomes merely the "conditional"--now in the
sense of a merely "hypothetical state" or also the "state of affairs."
There are always forces operative within a stabilized and stabilizing
system that contain the conditions of possibility and of keeping the system
closed, [5]
-
although there are chances to re-create the
truly conditional because "the conditions of possibility run, at times,
through space... through society... through the body of silence... through
beauty" (44). Not only here, Serres's discourse can be folded into the
discourse of cultural studies, especially as it concerns subaltern and
minority studies. In a historico-cultural context, for instance, settlers
work against the subjunctive and the virtual:possible by thinking in a
binary fashion that excludes inmixing, parasiting, hybridity, interfacing
and cross-overs: "As soon as they find, discover, invent a blank place,
the clamorous noisemakers who take the places race in, invade it, pin it
down with noise, fury, hatred and illusion, they bury it beneath their
tumult, and the original ones give up the place.... There are no
conquerors, there are excluded ones, banished ones, in search of a
place.... But this work of the negative drives out, banishes, excludes the
middle, the third position" (77-78). Only a "third estate" or a "third
space" which would include the complex space of the parasite--and in a
literary frame, paraciting--could deconstruct the empire of duality and
open up a once more multiplex field, [6]
-
a space once more populated by "crowds, packs, hordes" which are also Gilles
Deleuze's counterterms to "the mass," which Serres, in a possible reference
to Deleuze, relates to Leibniz, who "called them aggregates." Such an aggregate
"is not a well-formed object" (2-3). It is always on such unstable,
"far from equilibrium" machinic aggregates (Deleuze would call them
"desiring-machines") that ordered systems are erected: [7]
-
History, then, is originally a virtual field of possibilities: a "plane
of immanence" laced with chance tissue. This plane functions as an underlying
historical matrix, because "the multiple... [is] the ordinary lot of
situations" (5) and "history is... born... of circumstances" (100),
as C.S. Peirce noted when he called for a historical tychism. On
this multiple site, artificial orders--"planes of transcendence"--and
divisions (of people, of classes, of territories, of eras in
historiography) are stenciled. In order to deterritorialize these planes
of transcendence again, one has to treat them, like every complex and
chaotic aggregate, as "not a closed system" (98). [8]
-
The pure--either white or black--background noise on which each order
rests is ultimately untamable, even by the "relentless" project of
rationalism,
which is why the state of historical multiplexity is so terrifying (i.e.,
the sites of Pynchon's "Zone(s)": Europe in
Gravity's Rainbow, America
in Mason & Dixon) and in some of its aspects is so downright
inhuman: "Under the world of language, this wave, and beneath the wave,
the black noise. The unknown, the infra-subject of hate and
multiplicity" (139). [9]
-
The multiplex background noise of matter is a chromatic clamor, an acoustic
"turbulence, it is order and disorder at the same time, order revolving
on itself through repetition and redundancy, disorder through chance occurrences,
through the drawing of lots at the crossroads, and through the global meandering,
unpredictable and crazy. An arborescent and turbulent rumor" (59). Inherently
random, it resists its ultimate integration into ordered linearity.
In terms of chaos-theory or the theory of complexity, it is non-compressible,
which means that it is un-categorizable and "incalculable... measureless.
It always exceeds the machines' capacity for calculation" (127), as is
the case with a series of numbers, which is defined as random if the smallest
algorithm capable of specifying its recreation by a computer needs about
the same number of bits of information as the original series consists
of. This is why to compute a chaotic, complex, and multiplex system, one
would need a computer "as big as the system itself." In a logic comparable
to Borges's famous map, one would need a map as big as the territory. [10]
-
A narrative field that keeps a large number of stories going on at the
same time, criss-crossing them, without a final resolution other than death,
follows the same agenda as philosophy does in Serres's narrative. For both,
the objective is to conditionalize, which means to open up possibilities
rather than to work toward suturing confluences. The objective is to climb
up the descending slope of growing order toward more multiplexity and
toward more bifurcations. As Serres notes, "the philosopher keeps watch
over unforeseeable and fragile conditions, his position is unstable, mobile,
suspended, the philosopher seeks to leave ramifications and bifurcations
open, in opposition to the confluences that connect them or close them.
He goes back up the thalweg a bit, he climbs the chreod" (23). Multiplex
storylining or philosophizing creates a space of a thousand plateaus, a
"multiplicity of spaces" (60) that changes and oscillates according to
each point-of-view, so that the narrative (as well as history and philosophy)
becomes a picture-puzzle, like "paintings that, from one angle, show a
nude woman, from another a scene from history, from elsewhere still a seascape.
They are composed on purpose to say everything, under the assumption that
from every site their scenography changes" (50). In such a multiplex topology,
"all narratives have value, all theories as well. Every site delivers its
coherence, invisible from any neighboring site" (51).¶ The utopia
of such a narrative aggregate is Babel, as the figure of "an unintegrable
multiplicity, a sort of intermittent aggregate, not closed upon its unity"
(124). In an image reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari's diagram of the
rhizome, in which order and disorder are forever intersecting, and in which
every production of order and information is countered by dissemination
and deconstruction, Serres "propose[s] the hypothesis, on which Kant must
have paused awhile, that the universe vibrates between the one and the
other, that it never stops pulsating... from a homothetic tower in which
the apex... is a system, to a homothetic tower in which the apex... is
a multiplicity" (130).¶ Like Derrida's, but even more like Deleuze
and Guattari's, Serres's project is inherently literary. How to think the
world without falling into the trap of stasis and linear, that is, ultimately,
conceptual, thinking. As he states, evoking both the fluidity of chaotic
systems and processes as well as the complexity of the weather system, "we
despise contents, we administer flow charts" (3). The question is whether
it is possible to "speak of multiplicity itself without ever availing myself
of the concept?" (4); concepts being static and conceptual, because
"coding is nothing more than showing unities in the stead of multiplicitous
noise. Thus are concepts born" (86). The philosophical project would be
"to think a new object, multiple in space and mobile in time, unstable
and fluctuating like a flame, relational" (91). In this project, Serres
draws on Nietzsche's "fluid dynamics of perception" as well as on Bergson,
who is (with his theory of "becoming" and "processes" and his meditations
on the "pornography of perception") also an important influence on Deleuze
and Guattari. The question is whether the human mind can think without
concepts; or, in Bergsonian terms, whether it is possible to think pure
duration: "To think the surge, to think time, to think process,
directly.... The pure processual is chaotic, or, as I put it, chreotic,
as well" (97). [11]
- The multiplex, then, is another word
for the conditional. It designates the set of possibilities, the worlds
that are "ifed" by choosing one rational "new world order" over all
others. In a state in which everything is in a state of equal
potentiality, there is no separation into reality (is) and
imagination (if), because "before the point or the sense is
decided, there is a space where all senses are in flux" (51). This state
of un-differentiation is that of a pure multiplexity: "The raucous,
anarchic, noisy, variegated... jumbled-up, mixed-up multiple,
criss-crossed by myriad colors and myriad shades, is possibility itself.
It is a set of possible things, it may be the set of possible
things" (22). Serres uses once more natural images to describe the
multiplex. Multiplex spaces are ecological biospheres, or what Deleuze and
Guattari would call "smooth spaces": "The forest is multiplicity. The sea,
again, is multiplicity" (56). Not surprisingly, the weather, as the muse
of chaos theory, is the multiplex system par excellence. In a
reference to La Naissance, Serres talks of "the background
noise of the climate. We must praise any language that associates meteoric
clusters, hail, hurricane, turbulence, squall, with the Greek word
climate, which means: inclination" (102). As a chaotic system,
the "climate is an aggregate concept" (102). It shares with the rhizome
the characteristic of being "n-1" ("It constitutes linear
multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor
object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which
the One is always subtracted (n-1)" (Deleuze, Gilles and
Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, et al. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 1983. 21), because it is an incomputably complex aggregate;
such as a true democracy is an incomputably complex aggregate (the fact
that Whitman was so very aware of when he talked about America as an
"aggregate" in the "Democratic Vistas" [in: Complete Poetry and
Selected Prose. Ed. J. E. Miller. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.
455-501]). A "true" democracy should be like such a natural aggregate, in
the same way in which "a cloud is an aggregate, a nebulous set, a
multiplicity whose exact definition escapes us, and whose local movements
are beyond observation. A flame is an aggregate.... Heat and flame, cloud
and wind, climate and turbulence, we could refer to them as concepts for
multiplicities. We are, now, well enough prepared by our sciences to be
able to conceive them in their unanalyzable complexity" (103).¶ While
social aggregates tend toward unity, stability, and toward closure
("n+1") (Deleuze and Guattari call this process "molarization"),
a true aggregate should be an open system, which is why one has to stress
dissention (one might think here of Lyotard) and diversity. As Paul
Cilliers states in Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding
Complex Systems (New York: Routledge, 1998), "just as the
flow of energy is necessary to fight entropy and maintain the
complex structure of the system, society can only survive as
process" (122). [12]
-
Serres takes up the basic tenet of chaos
theory, namely that every order is only a spatial and temporal island in a
turbulent sea of disorder and multiplicity, when he states that the
universe itself is "an immense fractal turbulence, a global turbulence of
large, medium, small... microscopic turbulences" (106-7) and thus "a mix
of order and disorder" (107). As David Ruelle and others have shown,
turbulence is "an intermediary state, and also an aggregate mix.... Chaos
appears there, spontaneously, in the order, order appears there in the
midst of disorder.... The turbulent state mixes or associates the one and
the multiple, systematic gathering together and distribution" (109).
Oscillating between "lawful determinism and undeterminism" (109), it is a
field that cannot be thought by classical science ("Here, classical
science reigns, there, the new tree of multiplicities fluctuates" [109]),
and that cannot be described in reference to linear, reversible time
("Here, time is in legal expectation, there, our uncertainties waft along
on forecasts, in the meteorological sense" [109]).¶ As "turbulence is
a median state between a slightly redundant order and pure chaos" (121), it
can be described as "a chaotic multiplicity of orderly or unitary
multiplicities and chaotic multiplicities" (110). Ultimately, therefore,
"the cosmos is not a structure, it is a pure multiplicity of ordered
multiplicities and pure multiplicities" (111). In the science wars, then,
the voice of order might not have the final word: "It is always assumed
that multiplicities can, through various procedures, be eliminated. I
assume that they cannot be, I find that they cannot be and I hope that
they are not" (128). [13]
- One of Serres's examples to describe
the process of rational conceptualization involves the mathematical
differentiation between flux and fluxion (the one processual and analog,
the other static and digital). In this, he draws on Leibniz's introduction
of differential calculus into science, an introduction that has caused
science to describe "pornographies of flight."¶ "Fluent" is Newton's
term for variable. The aim is to find the rate of change of a variable, or
in Newton's wording "the fluxion of a given fluent." Fluxions are plotted
on graphs, such as the function y = x². Newton thought of the graph of a
function as a curve generated by a moving point P (x, y). As P traces the
curve both the x and the y coordinates continuously vary with time: time
itself was thought to "flow" at a uniform rate--hence the word
fluent. Newton now set out to find the rates of change of x and y
with respect to time--that is, their fluxions. This he did, as Dedekind
did with his famous "cut," by (1) considering the difference, or change,
in the values of x and y between two "adjacent" instances and then (2)
dividing this difference by the elapsed time interval. The final, crucial
step was to set the elapsed time interval equal to zero--or, more
precisely, to think of it as so small as to be negligible. In Serres's
words: "The differential of the flux is the fluxion. So the flux is a
sum, and classical rationality is safe, I am going from the local,
fluxion, to the global, flux, and conversely. Be advised: flux is a
multiplicity of fluctuations. So flux is unintegrable, it is not a sum,
the path from the global to the local and back can be cut. I am praying
for a completely new calculus for fluctuations, a different rationality
remains to be conceived" (65).¶ Via the logic of infinitesimal
calculus, rational thought claims to provide a smooth passage from the
local (particular) to the global (universal). Through breaking up the
global flux into particular fluxions, it claims that it can penetrate all
matter "through what is undoubtedly the most brilliant operation of all
time, the differentiation: we get fluxion, or a differential of flux. A
fluxion is a fraction of a flux as minimally different from the flux as
much as possible [sic], apart from size and order. The fluxion
vanishes as the flux flows along, fluxion drifts off as flux goes by. The
flux is at all points self-coded. Hence the open path from the local to
the global. Hence the simplest of methods, open through automorphism"
(99). As opposed to this cutting up and confluencing, Serres advocates a
thought that surfs on the pure processual and the fluxional: "the tip of
the crest of the swell, now that is what a fluctuation is.... The
noise,... the surge, is a multiplicity of which we do not know the sum
[again, the rhizomatic state that Deleuze & Guattari denote as
n-1]" (67). [14]
- Serres stays within the
fluid-dynamical reference when he uses the image of the thalweg, which
denotes the Lucretian inclination, to describe the trajectory of growing
order and confluence: "The downstream course, the worn-out path, the
slope, the chreod, run, from upstream confluences to downstream
confluences, toward synthesis and the unitary" (17). Given such an
ordering confluence, it is only by either going uphill, and thus
negentropically, or by tilting the complete plane that multiplexity can
once more come into being, because "the upstream course... multiplies its
bifurcations" (17). Given the "historical" implication of the thalweg,
Serres defines the passage from openness to closure as a fight of the old
vs. the young; a designation that can be applied to a young republic as
well: "The more the human body is young and the more it is possible, the
more it is capable of multiplicity, and the more time it has... the more
variety of river beds it has to flow down.... The entire volume of the old
body is occupied by archives, museums, traces, narratives" (32-3).
Becoming more and more inflexible, static and bound by the exoskeleton of
language, "our body comes down time.... It runs fatally along
determination" (35).¶ In this context, Serres once more
differentiates between rational, linear time and a multiplex time, which
consists of multiple temporal fluctuations: "Time is the positive
infinitude of possible determinations. It is the omnitude of novelties.
Time is not, as a rule, a line, although it may become one, and then start
selecting, sorting, eliminating, getting all at once bushier and bushier
with bifurcations: another time on top of time, appears; time, nonlinear,
is, most often, a sheet [narrative plane, page] or field" (115).
Ultimately, time--every moment:event--is an aggregate n-1 because
"time... is not a flux that can be differentiated into tiny little
fluxions... it is, for the most part, a sumless aggregate, a bundle of
dispersed fluctuations" (116). As so often in contemporary thought, the
parts are more than their sum. [15]
-
What underlies meaning is the pure noise of the moment, the sheer complexity
and potentiality of the undifferentiated and undifferentiable "now." This
is a time without binarisms, because "the
noise has no contrary.
The space of the noise has no complementary, no outside" (62). This
noise can be reached only when the subject stops being a sorting and coding
Maxwell's Demon. Serres evokes this regression through an image easily
transferable to a scene on the American prairies: "On the plain a noise
arises. A door and a direction, a semiconduction ["I am a semiconductor,
I admit it, I am the demon" (66)] and a way, a receiver, a Maxwell's demon.
The wind does not perhaps quite come whencesoever it will. In the beginning,
then, is the bifurcation" (63). Of course this question is also eminently
literary ("Can we imagine a chaotic and primal multiple with respect to
knowledge, a confused murmur, a noise that precedes and underlies
the classified encyclopedia?" [100]) and eminently political ("How much
disorder is necessary for living beings [and] for history?" [132]). In
terms of language, this regression implies a return, through language's
function of naming, to once more unnamed words: "In the beginning are nameless
words, verbs without nouns... this fractal complexity is a trace of the
multiple, the real multiple, different in every aspect.... The multiple
moves, that is all. In the beginning is the multiple: it rushes around"
(101). Such words move around freely, playing "mindless games" (outside
of the agenda of production and of meaning, and, of course, outside
of agenda of the production of meaning), like children do when they become
sheer movement. It is through these incomputable, improbable moments that
"newness enters the world," because they are moments of possibility and
of surprise. As Serres notes, "if we are alive, it is because we know,
because we hope that the unforeseeable will happen, that it will be
unconnected
to what is already there" (134). [16]
-
Ultimately, the Serrian project
calls for the attempt chiastically to cross order and disorder rather than
to think in binarisms; to "extricate... [oneself] from the hell of
dualism.... The one is in the multiple and chaos is in order" (131-2). It
is in this concern that his poetics are at the most acute. Rather than
opting for simplifications and separations, he evokes a field of thought
defined by complexity. Similar to the "ecosophy" that Félix
Guattari advocates in Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic
Paradigm (Trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1995), Serres's philosophy is an intricate machine that maps
chaos theory (the theory of complexity), the history of science,
philosophy, and art. The "space of thought" created by this machine is a
philosophical mobile in which, as in Marcel Duchamp's Unhappy
Ready-Made, static geometrics (as a figure of the static, fully
rational sciences that Serres is so often writing about and criticizing in
the name of complexity) are suspended into the weather of life. The latter
consists of an edition of Euclid's Elements, which Duchamp
gave to his sister as a wedding gift with the instruction to suspend it
from her balcony by a thread. Through this suspension of the very emblem
of Euclidean geometry into the turbulent space of the climate--the
suspension of "the elements" into "the elements"--the book, and with it
science, becomes a true mobile. In this context, Serres's books are not
asking for a return to a state of irrationality, but for a new rationality
that shows respect to and that incorporates into its project the
unpredictabilities, the probabilities (symptomatically, in the newspapers
around the turn of the century, the weather forecast used to be called
"the probabilities"), and the complexities and the "emergent" character of
the world. They ultimately
ask for an in-itself turbulent and complex rationality, and thus for a new
contract with nature. [start]
Dept. of American Literature and Culture
University of Cologne
hanjo.berressem@uni-koeln.de
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